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Research Article

Gender differences in willingness to move for interregional job offers

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Abstract

BACKGROUND
Interregional job offers are an important mechanism of social mobility as they provide both career chances and opportunities to avoid unemployment. We know from the literature that couples have difficulties seizing these opportunities due to the unequal distribution of costs and benefits between partners. Consequently, couples generally show a lower willingness to move for a job offer for one of the partners. However, very little is known about the differences between men and women in assessing the attractiveness of a job-related household move.

OBJECTIVE
Focusing on all cohabitating couples, we address whether there are gender differences in willingness to move for a better job offer and how those differences can be explained.

METHODS
We employ a large household survey from Germany that includes a factorial survey experiment addressing willingness to move for a hypothetical job offer.

RESULTS
We find that (a) within couples, women show a lower willingness to move than men, but single women do not differ from single men; (b) variables resulting from standard theories on mobility contribute to the explanation of willingness to move; and (c) gender differences persist even after controlling for these variables.

CONCLUSIONS
Women show a lower willingness to move for a job when they are living with a partner in a household, and this cannot be sufficiently explained by standard theories of

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household and family migration. Only gender norms contribute significantly to the explanation of these differences between sexes. Consequently, women are disadvantaged when considering interregional job offers.

CONTRIBUTION

Our findings reveal that interregional job offers contribute to gender inequality by hampering the career options of coupled women. A comparison with early results from the United States reveals that this seems to be a general pattern that cannot be explained by standard household migration theories.

1. Introduction

Regional mobility is an important mechanism of labor market mobility. As jobs are most likely to be generated in regions with dense populations and because jobs are scarce (especially for specialized employees), obtaining a better job often requires some kind of spatial mobility. Consequently, workers who are more mobile obtain higher wages (e.g., Yankow 2003; Ham, Li, and Reagan 2011) and exhibit a lower risk of unemployment spells (Pissarides and Wadsworth 1989; for an overview, see Bähr and Abraham 2016: 45).

However, mobility costs can be high and can hamper the matching process across regional labor markets. This is especially true for couples when one partner receives an incentive to move for a better job. Although the household will gain from a higher income, not all household members may benefit from the move individually. The loss of social contacts and the costs of adaptation to the new place are usually easier to compensate for the job mover. Moreover, if both partners are employed, couples face the 'tied mover problem' (Mincer 1978). Since it is unlikely that both partners will get a better job offer in the same place, the couple is confronted with the tied mover's losses due to the move initiated by the partner.

The fact that women have traditionally had a weaker labor market position and greater involvement in the household has led to a vast amount of research on gender differences as related to household moves. In particular, older studies confirmed that the female partner exhibited a much higher probability of becoming a tied mover. These studies showed that a household move caused deterioration of women's wages (Lichter 1983; Long 1974; Maxwell 1988; Shihadeh 1991; Morrison and Lichter 1988) and employment chances (DaVanzo 1976; Duncan and Perrucci 1976; Long 1974; Sandell 1977). However, more recent studies find decreasing penalties for women (e.g., Zaiceva 2010; Clark and Withers 2002; Nisic and Melzer 2016; Preston and Grimes 2017) and less evidence of female tied movers and male dominance of mobility decisions

(Brandén 2013; Cooke 2013a; Coulter, van Ham, and Feijten 2011, 2012). Moreover, women seem to be as satisfied as men with a long-distance move, despite their structural disadvantages in the labor market (Nowok et al. 2013: 998). Nevertheless, it is still clear that people living in a partnership are less mobile in general and are less likely to accept a regionally distant job (Quigley and Weinberg 1977; Nivalainen 2004; Geist and McManus 2008).

Although we have vast knowledge about the returns of mobility and the gender-specific differences regarding those effects, research on actual mobility is always hampered by a 'mover's bias': Only successful movers can be compared with nonmovers (a category that includes individuals who decided against a move and those who never received an incentive to move at all). Moreover, the reasons for a move are often not known to the researcher. One potential way to overcome these problems is to focus on self-reported willingness to move. This approach has the advantage of allowing us to rely on information about potential mobility among individuals who did not actually receive an incentive to move during any one reporting period (Markham and Pleck 1986).

Although there is extensive literature addressing the consequences of a household move, very little is known about gender-specific differences in the intention to move for a better job. Most research has focused exclusively on dual-career partnerships, neglecting the fact that gender differences may also occur in other couples. Additionally, the research focusing on the female tied mover mostly has not considered the possibility that women may also receive a better job offer (but see Abraham et al. 2013; Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010, 2015; Abraham and Nisic 2012; Abraham and Schönholzer 2012; Bähr and Abraham 2016). However, if men and women differ in their willingness to move for a new job, we will observe different labor market outcomes for the two sexes. An early study by Markham and Pleck (1986) based on the 1977/78 Quality of Employment Survey for the United States found that women showed lower willingness to move for a job, even when explanatory variables were controlled. They concluded that "the sex difference in willingness to move may be one factor working against women's occupational advancement" (Markham and Pleck 1986: 138). Relying on the same data, Bielby and Bielby (1992) found that gender role attitudes, in particular, mediate the gender effect. Besides the fact that these studies were based on data from the 1970s, the measure of willingness was quite restricted (the respondents were offered a 'much better job' at a 100-mile distance). Finally, Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz (2010) employed a vignette design for testing bargaining models with respect to mobility decisions in partnerships. Although they did not focus explicitly on gender differences, they observed in the Constance–Berne vignette survey that women in dual-career partnerships also found transregional job offers to be less attractive than did men. Although their vignette design was similar to the experimental

design used in this study, the Constance–Berne survey was based on a nonrandom sample and lacked additional behavioral measures beyond the hypothetical vignette decisions. Moreover, the number of control variables was limited, and no theoretical explanation for the gender differences in willingness to move was offered.

We go beyond this literature in several ways. First, we focus on the willingness to move among all couples while controlling for various combinations of partners' labor market status. This allows us to identify the general gender difference in willingness to move. Second, we employ a factorial survey similar to that of Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz (2010) that allows us to vary the characteristics of the job offer experimentally. In this way, we can control the quality of the job offer. Third, we go beyond the early vignette study by contrasting this instrument with behavioral data on actual application behavior. Moreover, employing a large German study, we are able to analyze the responses of approximately 2,400 respondents with cohabitating partners. The rich dataset enables us to control for many variables. Based on this data design, we focus on three research questions: First, are there gender differences in willingness to move for a (better) interregional job offer? Second, what are the determinants that favor or hamper a long-distance move? Third, how do these determinants contribute to the explanation of gender differences in willingness to move? By answering these questions, we contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we supplement the available results regarding the effects of mobility by looking at the preceding decisions regarding whether to become mobile in the first place. Second, by focusing on gender differences within couples, we are able to identify a possible mechanism of gender inequality in the labor market. Third, we are able to determine whether the findings from the United States in the 1970s – showing a persistent gender difference in willingness to move – are still replicable for Germany in 2011.

2. Gender differences in willingness to move: Theoretical considerations

Our theoretical and empirical focus is on couples cohabitating at the time of the interview. This comprises all combinations of both partners' labor market status. Although we focus on labor-market-induced mobility, it is important to acknowledge that persons who are currently inactive in the labor market may also receive job offers. Since men are nearly always employed, this is mostly relevant for inactive women. Consequently, to estimate a general, unbiased gender difference in willingness to move, it is important to include those cases as well. We further assume that one of the partners receives a job offer that yields higher income and/or career opportunities than the

current job or unemployment receipts. However, to accept this job, the household has to move to another region, which involves mobility costs.[3]

Previous research has focused primarily on two questions: Will the household relocate, and what are the consequences of the move for each of the partners? It is important to acknowledge that the two questions are tightly linked to each other: The individual preferences for a household move will strongly depend on the expected consequences for the household and the individual. If the partners differ in their assessment of the situation, household migration becomes less likely (see, e.g., Coulter, van Ham, and Feijten 2012). In the literature, this has been theoretically modeled for dual-earner couples in particular, who specifically face the problem of coordinating two careers and their family household. As Mincer (1978) noted, it is unlikely that both partners will receive a better job in the same place. Hence, incentives to move for a better job are mostly one-sided, leaving the other partner in the position of the 'tied mover' if the household relocates: The tied mover will lose his or her job in the old place and has to find a new job in the destination; this new job can be assumed to be worse than the old one. Consequently, the literature has concentrated on the effects of the tied mover, finding that the employment situation of women will generally deteriorate after a household move (Lichter 1983; Long 1974; Maxwell 1988; Shihadeh 1991; Morrison and Lichter 1988). However, the female tied mover seems to be a rare type, and tied stayers are more common for both sexes (Cooke 2013a). Moreover, more recent studies have found that the female disadvantage actually decreases, especially when the household moves to an urban region with a dense labor market (Zaiceva 2010; Clark and Withers 2002; Nisic and Melzer 2016). Although research has focused primarily on the dual-earner case, the basic argument can be applied to other couples as well. Even if a partner is not employed, there could be substantial costs of moving, comprising the loss of contacts, social capital, arrangements for childcare and schooling, or simply a place of identification (Lewicka 2011).

In both dual-earner and single-earner couples, the problem of losses for the tied mover should lead to a reduced willingness to move for both partners and, consequently, to reduced mobility of dual-career couples in general. Therefore, the increasing immobility of coupled persons compared to singles is one of the most stable findings in mobility research (see, e.g., Cooke 2013b; Vidal et al. 2017). As recent studies have shown, this immobility is caused not only by the higher mobility costs of a family household but also by the anticipation of an asymmetrical distribution of these costs within the household. The person receiving the job offer is less willing to move when the costs for the tied mover increase (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010; Rabe 2011).

[3] In this paper, we focus theoretically as well as empirically on long-distance moves; hence, we exclude the possibility of commuting as a solution to this problem.

Despite the existing results in terms of the reduced mobility of couples in general, we know little about the gender differences regarding willingness to consider an interregional job offer. This knowledge gap is important because women may also receive such job offers, especially when we take increased female education and employment into account. If men and women react differently to these incentives, men – more often than women – will be able to accept a better job offer by moving the household to another region. This difference will contribute to explaining the observed gender inequality in the labor market. The two studies that are most relevant to our paper are based on data from the 1970s and found persistent gender effects regarding willingness to move – effects that could not be explained by a large set of explanatory variables (Markham and Pleck 1986; Bielby and Bielby 1992). A similar finding was published by Baldridge, Eddleston, and Veiga (2006), who observed a lower willingness to move for female managers, even when controlling for family characteristics. Moreover, these family characteristics dampened the attractiveness of relocation, especially for women.

In line with these studies, we focus on three different types of determinants of the question of whether men and women show an unequal willingness to move: First, women's job offers are less advantageous than men's; second, the costs of a move or the benefits of staying differ between men and women; and third, the collective decision process in the household favors men's moves.

The first mechanism that produces gender differences assumes unequal labor market positions between men and women. This is most prominently shown in the literature on the gender pay gap, which documents a stable disadvantage for women concerning the returns of labor (see e.g., Hinz and Gartner 2005; Ridgeway 2011). We know from this research that on average, women are concentrated in specific, but often regionally dispersed (Benson 2014) labor market segments, frequently have part-time jobs, earn less than men (Altonji and Blank 1999; England 2005), and anticipate fewer career opportunities (Stroh, Brett, and Reilly 1996; Deschacht, de Pauw, and Baert 2017). Since these determinants are associated with the occupational structure, gender-specific occupations are often seen as one crucial determinant of a structural disadvantage for women. Consequently, some scholars have shown that occupational affiliation also affects the chance for regional mobility (e.g., Perales and Vidal 2013; Reichelt and Abraham 2017).

In view of these findings, the interregional job offers received by women could simply be less advantageous than those received by men. This reduced incentive makes a household move less attractive. Moreover, given lower female wages, it is more difficult for women to compensate the income losses of their partners, which are likely to occur if they are to follow their spouses as tied movers (Nisic 2009; Nisic and Melzer 2016).

The second type of argument is based on the observation that a household's residence can "tie people into kinship and social networks extending beyond the household unit" (Coulter, van Ham, and Findlay 2016: 353). This 'linked lives approach' highlights the importance of social relationships that, for example, provide support and therefore influence the costs of a move and/or the benefits of staying. Here, it can be assumed that those costs and benefits may differ between the sexes (see, e.g., Thomas, Mulder, and Cooke 2017: 601). Although women have shown rising labor market participation in recent decades in most western societies (Cipollone, Patacchini, and Vallanti 2014), they still have the main responsibility for the household and children. Consequently, women have to reconcile household and labor to a greater extent than men do (Fahlén 2016). For this reason, women rely heavily on a local 'reconciliation arrangement,' which comprises investments in, for example, the search for affordable childcare, social support networks, and housing close to those sources of support and care. These arrangements are costly and difficult to establish in a new place, resulting in a reduced willingness to move for a new job, even if it yields higher income and career chances. This mechanism is expected to be especially relevant for couples with children, as the need for appropriate household arrangements is highest in these cases.

A third possible reason why women may be less interested than men in interregional job offers may be found in the way that collective decisions are made in the household. The fundamental idea is that decision rules favor men's moves and, thus, lead to disadvantages for women in a partnership. There are two different mechanisms underlying this type of explanation. The first explanation results from bargaining theory (Ott 1992; Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010), which focuses on the relative bargaining power of the partners. Within this framework, the female disadvantage in labor market positions leads to women having less bargaining power within a partnership (England and Farkas 1986; Ott 1992). Bargaining power can be defined either by the relative resources a person contributes to the partnership (Blood and Wolfe 1960) or by outside options available to the partnership (Bernasco and Giesen 2000; Ott 1992).

Second, gender-specific norms and roles – such as the male breadwinner model – favor male careers (Bielby and Bielby 1992; Jürges 2006). It is usually assumed that more traditional norms lead to household moves induced by male employment opportunities, whereas more egalitarian beliefs should at least decrease the female disadvantage. A similar argument can be deduced from the 'doing gender' approach (West and Zimmerman 1987) if it is assumed that employment-induced moves jeopardize the construction of gender for women. Although gender-specific norms are an important theoretical argument about gender differences in mobility, direct tests of this mechanism are still scarce. Cooke (2008) found that egalitarian couples exhibited a

higher probability of moving when the female partner was unemployed, whereas traditional couples did not react to unemployment of the female spouse. Similarly, Lersch (2016) demonstrated that women with an egalitarian partner are less likely to leave employment after a household move, whereas those with a partner holding traditional beliefs exhibit a higher probability of dropping out of the labor market. However, the results regarding the effects of gender ideologies are far from consistent. For example, Brandén (2014) analyzed willingness to move as well as actual moves for a Swedish sample. Although she confirmed a higher willingness to move for women than men if the spouse received a distant job offer, after adding gender roles to her analysis, she concluded that "this cannot be fully explained by gender ideology or behavior" (Brandén 2014: 968). However, theoretically, we can conclude that gendered norms about the division of employment and household labor should lead to a lower willingness to move for women compared to men.

Although the three types of determinants rely on different mechanisms, all of these theoretical considerations lead us to the assumption that men and women should differ when evaluating an interregional job offer. Hence, we hypothesize the following:

> *Hypothesis 1*: In a partnership, women show less willingness than men to make a long-distance move for a new job.

Moreover, the three types of explanations suggest various determinants that should have an impact on the willingness to move regardless of gender. First, the structure of job offers should have an impact on the willingness to move:

> *Hypothesis 2a*: The more attractive an interregional job offer is in terms of additional earnings or career options, the higher the willingness to move for the new job will be.

Second, the costs of a move should be crucial. In particular, the household's embeddedness in the local social structure and the social capital resulting from that embeddedness should play an important role in willingness to move for a job. Past research has shown that social capital and local ties generally reduce mobility (Baldridge, Eddleston, and Veiga 2006; Kan 2007) and that this is especially relevant for family migration (Mulder and Malmberg 2014). Moreover, the presence of children increases the cost of a move.

> *Hypothesis 2b*: The higher the local embeddedness of a person, the lower the willingness to move for the new job will be.

Third, collective decision rules could lead to a gender gap in willingness to move for a new job. A first mechanism here is a gender-specific distribution of bargaining power, resulting from different employment patterns and income possibilities. Hence, we assume that

> *Hypothesis 2c*: The higher the bargaining power of a person in a partnership is, the lower the willingness to move for the new job will be.

A second mechanism is based on gender norms and roles, which could reduce female willingness to move. Traditional gender norms concerning family and female employment reinforce the dominance of the household and family sphere for women, resulting in, for example, the male breadwinner model. Consequently, such traditional gender-specific norms should hamper career-oriented mobility – especially for women – and foster those of men (Bielby and Bielby 1992):

> *Hypothesis 2d*$_1$: The stronger gender-specific norms about employment and household labor are in a partnership, the lower the woman's willingness to move for the new job will be.

> *Hypothesis 2d*$_2$: The stronger gender-specific norms about employment and household labor are in a partnership, the higher the man's willingness to move for the new job will be.

Based on these theoretical considerations and hypotheses, we can finally try to explain the gender differences in willingness to move for an interregional job offer. Hypotheses 2a–2d specify the determinants that should influence willingness to move in general. Moreover, our discussion revealed that these determinants are shaped differently for women and men who live in a partnership. Consequently, we should observe that the difference between the two sexes concerning willingness to move (as stated by Hypothesis 1) should be reduced by controlling for these determinants.

> *Hypothesis 3a*: When controlling for the characteristics of interregional job offers, the gender difference in willingness to move should decrease.

> *Hypothesis 3b*: When controlling for the household's local embeddedness, the gender difference in willingness to move should decrease.

> *Hypothesis 3c*: When controlling for the allocation of bargaining power in a partnership, the gender difference in willingness to move should decrease.

Hypothesis 3d: When controlling for the gender-specific norms in a partnership, the gender difference in willingness to move should decrease.

3. Data and methods

To empirically test our hypotheses, we employ data from the fifth wave of the Panel Study Labour Market and Social Security (PASS) (Trappmann et al. 2019). PASS is a German household panel survey with yearly waves since 2007. It focuses on the labor market, poverty, and the receipt of welfare benefits. The target population of PASS is households residing in Germany. Households receiving welfare benefits are oversampled (Trappmann, Müller, and Bethmann 2013). Data is collected in either CAPI (computer-assisted personal interview) or CATI (computer-assisted telephone interview) mode, depending on the availability of contact information for either mode and respondents' preferences. In wave five of PASS, 15,607 individuals in 10,235 households were interviewed.

The fifth wave of PASS (2011) includes extraordinarily rich information on labor-market-related mobility and is therefore especially suited to address our research questions. The questionnaire module on job searches contains questions on the general willingness to relocate to take up a new job (dichotomous: yes/no) and a factual question on whether a job seeker applied for a job more than 100 kilometers away from his or her current residence.

Furthermore, PASS wave five collected adequate measurements of variables that can be used to identify mechanisms underlying gender differences for both partners, which include employment status, job income, presence and age of children, marital status, gender role attitudes, and a large set of social capital measures.

In addition to these questions, wave five contained a factorial survey experiment (see, e.g., Auspurg and Hinz 2015) focusing on the attractiveness of hypothetical job offers. Respondents received a randomly selected set of short descriptions of job offers that differed in characteristics such as income, working hours, contract duration, job requirements, opportunities for promotion, and distance from their homes. (For a translated example, see Figure 1, and for more details, see Abraham et al. 2013; Frodermann et al. 2013.) The main advantage of this design is that all respondents receive job offers of the same quality, thus standardizing the labor–demand side and enabling the labor–supply side to be isolated.

Figure 1: Vignette example (translated, varying dimensions highlighted)

If you accepted the offered job, your net household income will **rise to 3,510 euros**. The working hours are approximately **20 hours** per week, and the job requirements are **significantly below** your professional skills. The job offers **many opportunities for internal promotion** and is **limited to 3 years**. The one-way trip from your current place of residence to the location of the job is approximately **6 hours**. The labor market at the new location is **worse** than at your current residence. Finding appropriate housing there will require **considerable effort**.

How likely would you be to **accept the offer**?

Very unlikely ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Very likely

All jobs offered involved long commutes. While for one-third of the job offers a daily commute was an option (one-way commute time of one hour), the other two-thirds of vignettes involved distances beyond a daily commute (four and six hours, respectively). The experimental design guaranteed that men and women received job offers of the same quality. Furthermore, the hypothetical income mentioned in the vignette was presented in such a way that the actual household income was increased by a fixed percentage. Thus, differences between men and women in terms of the losses of the tied mover are excluded by the experimental design.

Table 1: Vignette dimensions and levels

Dimension		Levels		
		1	2	3
1	Percentage increase in net household income	5 levels, from plus 0% to plus 80%		
2	Weekly working hours	20 hours	30 hours	40 hours
3	Level of over-qualification	None	Slight	Considerable
4	Prospects for promotion	None	Few	Many
5	Contract duration	Permanent	Limited to one year	Limited to three years
6	Distance from home (one-way commuting time)	1 hour	4 hours	6 hours
7	Local employment opportunities compared to place of residence	Worse	Similar	Better
8	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation	Very easy	Some effort	Considerable effort

Due to the complexity of the vignettes (with a total of eight dimensions, see Table 1 for an overview), the module was administered only to respondents who participated in the CAPI mode of the survey, where the vignettes could be presented visually.[4]

[4] The CAPI interviewer would turn the laptop computer with the CAPI program so that the respondents would be able to read the vignettes on the screen and then fill in their answer. This has the additional benefit

Furthermore, the vignettes were presented only to respondents who were either employed or unemployed and, thus, available to the labor market.

A further advantage of the PASS data is the oversampling of welfare benefit recipients. Almost half of these individuals are unemployed and, thus, actively seeking a job, which increases the number of observations for those items administered only to job seekers (see below).

To test our hypotheses, we made use of a wide variety of operationalizations of the dependent variable 'willingness to move.' First, we used information from the vignette module on the respondent's willingness to accept an interregional job offer that is one, four, or six hours away from their current residence (Abraham et al. 2013: 289). The rating was based on an 11-point scale, and the job offers would increase household income by 0% to 80%. This question was asked of all respondents available to the labor market (either employed or unemployed) who were interviewed in CAPI mode (see Table A-1 for the sample restrictions and sizes). Each of these respondents received five vignettes.

As a second indicator, we used the respondents' stated general willingness to move, which was part of a survey module on a willingness to make concessions for a new job. The exact wording was "When looking for a job, sometimes disadvantages have to be accepted. Please tell me whether you would 'Definitely not,' 'Probably not,' 'Probably,' or 'Definitely' accept the following disadvantages: (item F) 'A change in the place of residence.'" This module was presented to all persons who had been searching for a job in the four weeks prior to the survey interview, except for those looking for an additional second job (see Table A-1 for additional details).

A third indicator, which was also collected from respondents who had been searching for a job in the four weeks prior to the interview, was the number of actual applications during the past four weeks for jobs that were more than 100 kilometers away from the respondent's current residence. This question was asked with an open numeric format (range 0–99).

Turning to the independent or moderating variables in the hypotheses, we included a number of classical variables from the literature to control for the cost structure of the mobility decision-making process. We used the net household income to also consider the financial situation of actors without individual income. Income was measured in thousands of euros. We controlled the age of the respondents to address human capital arguments regarding the investment decision about labor market mobility. Property ownership is also an impeding factor because the investment is local, and funds are tied down in the short-term, which makes moving more expensive.

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that the interviewer is not aware of the answers given, which should reduce the social desirability bias of the answers.

We use detailed information about the labor market status in PASS to control for different forms of employment (full-time, part-time, atypical,[5] or self-employment) and distinguished unemployment based on durations of less than or greater than 24 months. The latter distinction allowed us to separate the long-term effects of unemployment on the willingness to engage in mobility, which could differ from the experience of shorter spells of joblessness. Employed and unemployed individuals should differ in their willingness to make concessions for a new job (Abraham et al. 2013).

We exploit the fact that PASS respondents are sampled at the household level to operationalize relative bargaining power by generating indicators for labor market resources relative to the partner. For education, job income, occupational status, and job experience, we create a variable indicating whether the respondent or the partner has acquired relatively more resources or if both have equal resources.[6]

For the partnership's characteristics, we included a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was married to his or her cohabiting partner. Marriage can be a signal of durability and therefore of the mutual dependence of a couple. Another factor that moderates the influence of a partner on the respondent's decision-making is relationship quality. We used information on the frequency of conflicts within the household as a proxy for this parameter.[7]

Our concept of local embeddedness included several dimensions. First, social relationships at the place of residence constitute valuable social capital for an actor and are the result of longstanding investments in relationships with others (Flap and Völker 2013; Lin 2002). These ties can provide valuable resources such as information, emotional support, or instrumental support. Because social contacts are largely local, relocating for a new job puts the mover at risk of losing these valuable connections that would need to be built up again, at potentially high costs at the new place of work (Nisic and Petermann 2013). We operationalized this dimension of local social embeddedness using two variables: the size of the core network of close friends and relatives (open numeric, range 0–99) and a question about how strongly attached the respondent felt to his/her place of residence (labeled five-point scale, recoded to range from 'not at all' to 'very strong'). The second dimension of local embeddedness is the respondent's own children living in their household. Children are an important cost factor when considering relocation for a new job because new arrangements for childcare or schooling must be found.

Local labor market conditions have been shown to strongly influence mobility decisions (Kley 2013; see, e.g., Pissarides and Wadsworth 1989; Windzio 2008).

[5] Atypical employment consists of any combination of marginal part-time work (<20h per week), marginal employment (low absolute level of earnings or of short duration), fixed-term work or temporary work.

[6] In cases where the partner was not available for an interview, this information could not be generated. To be able to include these cases in the analysis, we introduced a 'no partner interview' category in the models.

[7] From this information, the household member with whom conflicts arise cannot be determined.

Unemployment rates can vary by occupation and gender, thus generating different contexts for each partner in a couple. We address this issue by controlling for federal-state-level unemployment rates that are specific to gender and the two-digit occupational group. In addition, we capture the regional context by including the municipality size at the place of residence and whether the respondent lives in the eastern part of Germany (former GDR).

Gender-specific norms were measured based on a scale of gender role attitudes with respect to labor market participation. All items were measured on a labeled four-point agreement/disagreement scale and loaded on one factor[8] that can be interpreted as traditional family values. The wording was as follows: "A. A woman should be ready to reduce her working hours to spend more time with her family" (+); "B. It is nice to have a job, but what most women really want is a home and children" (+); "C. A working mother can have an equally affectionate relationship with her children as a stay-at-home mother" (–); and "D. It is a husband's duty to earn money and the wife's duty to take care of home and family." (+). From these items, we created a regression-predicted factor score that was centered at the sample mean as a measure of traditional family values.

We tested our hypotheses using a series of linear regression models. For the vignette outcome, we started with a model including only gender and the vignette dimensions. For the other two outcomes, we started with a model including gender only. We then successively introduced sets of control variables to test whether supposed mechanisms would eliminate or reduce the initial effect.

Our dependent variables deviated from the requirements of the linear regression model. The vignette evaluation scale has 11 values, while the hypothetical job offers are rated on a four-point scale and the number of interregional applications is clearly a count variable; thus, ordered and count regression, respectively, would be more appropriate. However, using these more specific models did not change our results. Therefore, we follow Angrist and Pischke (2009: 197) in that we provide all results as ordinary least square regression estimates, which are simple to compute, easily interpreted as marginal effects, and comparable across studies, samples, and models.

We report cluster-robust standard errors (Rogers 1993) for the vignette experiment to control for the dependence of observations within respondents. For the other two dependent variables, robust standard errors (Huber 1967; White 1980) are reported.

[8] Principal component polychoric factor analysis with varimax rotation was used. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .74, which was above the commonly recommended value of .6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant (χ^2 (6) = 22,484, $p < .0001$). The factor solution predicted a single factor (2.28) with an eigenvalue above one. Factor scores were predicted using regression scoring and subsequently centered at the sample mean.

4. Empirical results

For all hypotheses, we discuss results from the PASS dataset for respondents with partners inside the household, first for the acceptance evaluation of the vignette job offer (Table 2), then for the general willingness to relocate for a job offer (Table 3), and third for the actual applications to interregional vacancies (Table 4). Tables A-3 to A-5 in the Appendix contain the corresponding models for respondents without partners.

While all CAPI respondents that were available to the labor market, in general, underwent the factorial survey experiment, only respondents that were searching for jobs within the last four weeks received the questions about their general willingness and their actual interregional applications, which led to different sample sizes but also had conceptual implications. The factorial survey experiment (Table 2 and Table A-3) in effect standardizes the labor-demand side and eliminates the selectivity found in real labor markets, which should allow the identification of causal estimates of job offer characteristics but should also aid in observing the effects of job characteristics on respondent-level variables (e.g., gender) over a fuller range than what is normally found in the labor market. Our other two dependent variables were restricted to respondents who actually looked for a job and could, therefore, be expected to have grappled with the decision about regional mobility and, thus, represent a more informed group. The question of willingness to relocate for a job (Table 3 and Table A-4) did not provide any information about the job itself and was, therefore, an indicator of general willingness to relocate. The question about the number of interregional applications (Table 4 and Table A-5) asked for actual behavior, rather than hypothetical concessions, and thus brought in another perspective. Together, these indicators offer a unique perspective on gender-specific willingness to move.

We begin by testing Hypothesis 1 regarding gender differences in general. Subsequently, we examine our four core mechanisms, and for each, we first consider whether the respective variables have an effect on willingness to move (Hypothesis 2) and, second, whether the gender effect is explained by these mechanisms (Hypothesis 3).

Table 2: Acceptance of vignette job offer

All respondents with partner in household		Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Vignette level	Percentage increase in household income	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.025 ***	0.026 ***	0.026 ***	0.026 ***	0.026 ***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
	Weekly working hours (ref.: 20 hours)													
	30 hours	–0.362 ***	–0.351 ***	–0.351 ***	–0.337 ***	–0.339 ***	–0.339 ***	–0.336 ***	–0.336 ***	–0.347 ***	–0.346 ***	–0.345 ***	–0.347 ***	–0.347 ***
		(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)
	40 hours	–0.579 ***	–0.594 ***	–0.593 ***	–0.605 ***	–0.608 ***	–0.608 ***	–0.607 ***	–0.605 ***	–0.625 ***	–0.626 ***	–0.628 ***	–0.635 ***	–0.634 ***
		(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)
	Level of over-qualification (ref.: None)													
	Slight	–0.052	–0.059	–0.059	–0.080	–0.079	–0.079	–0.082	–0.081	–0.071	–0.072	–0.071	–0.077	–0.081
		(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
	Considerable	–0.170 *	–0.176 *	–0.177 *	–0.174 *	–0.176 *	–0.177 *	–0.179 *	–0.178 *	–0.164 *	–0.163 *	–0.173 *	–0.181 *	–0.186 **
		(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
	Prospects of promotion (ref.: None)													
	Few	0.018	0.025	0.025	0.017	0.014	0.014	0.0106	0.012	0.043	0.042	0.045	0.047	0.046
		(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
	Many	0.423 ***	0.426 ***	0.426 ***	0.418 ***	0.409 ***	0.410 ***	0.409 ***	0.407 ***	0.432 ***	0.431 ***	0.433 ***	0.443 ***	0.444 ***
		(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
	Duration of employment (ref.: Permanent employment)													
	Temporary, 1-year contract	–0.984 ***	–0.978 ***	–0.979 ***	–0.976 ***	–0.978 ***	–0.978 ***	–0.977 ***	–0.977 ***	–0.990 ***	–0.989 ***	–0.987 ***	–0.991 ***	–0.99 ***
		(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)
	Temporary, 3-year contract	–0.581 ***	–0.584 ***	–0.585 ***	–0.579 ***	–0.574 ***	–0.576 ***	–0.577 ***	–0.580 ***	–0.589 ***	–0.587 ***	–0.589 ***	–0.589 ***	–0.591 ***
		(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
	Commuting distance (ref.: One hour (one-way))													
	4 hours	–2.273 ***	–2.265 ***	–2.265 ***	–2.248 ***	–2.237 ***	–2.236 ***	–2.232 ***	–2.236 ***	–2.256 ***	–2.253 ***	–2.251 ***	–2.250 ***	–2.252 ***
		(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
	6 hours	–2.531 ***	–2.540 ***	–2.540 ***	–2.517 ***	–2.522 ***	–2.520 ***	–2.518 ***	–2.520 ***	–2.540 ***	–2.536 ***	–2.538 ***	–2.531 ***	–2.532 ***
		(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
	Local employment opportunities (ref.: Worse than place of residence)													
	Similar	0.287 ***	0.282 ***	0.282 ***	0.279 ***	0.279 ***	0.279 ***	0.282 ***	0.284 ***	0.304 ***	0.305 ***	0.307 ***	0.309 ***	0.309 ***
		(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
	Better	0.324 ***	0.317 ***	0.317 ***	0.327 ***	0.325 ***	0.326 ***	0.326 ***	0.324 ***	0.333 ***	0.336 ***	0.336 ***	0.333 ***	0.334 ***
		(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)

Table 2: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household		Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Vignette level	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation (ref.: Very easy)													
	With some effort	–0.214 **	–0.197 **	–0.197 **	–0.189 **	–0.199 **	–0.199 **	–0.201 **	–0.201 **	–0.207 **	–0.210 **	–0.215 **	–0.214 **	–0.212 **
		(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.070)
	With considerable effort	–0.388 ***	–0.375 ***	–0.375 ***	–0.374 ***	–0.375 ***	–0.376 ***	–0.376 ***	–0.371 ***	–0.379 ***	–0.379 ***	–0.378 ***	–0.374 ***	–0.374 ***
		(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Respondent level	**Gender: Female**	**–0.553 *** **	**–0.555 *** **	**–0.556 *** **	**–0.528 *** **	**–0.407 ** **	**–0.408 ** **	**–0.438 ** **	**–0.437 ** **	**–0.358 ***	**–0.361 ***	**–0.343 ***	**–0.308 ***	**–0.307 ***
		(0.102)	**(0.110)**	**(0.111)**	**(0.109)**	**(0.128)**	**(0.128)**	**(0.133)**	**(0.133)**	**(0.146)**	**(0.146)**	**(0.145)**	**(0.144)**	**(0.144)**
	Household income in 1,000 euros	–0.072 +	–0.055 +	–0.054 +	–0.014	–0.007	–0.007	–0.002	–0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.004
		(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
	Age of respondent		–0.037 ***	–0.037 ***	–0.026 ***	–0.026 ***	–0.025 ***	–0.025 ***	–0.025 ***	–0.028 ***	–0.028 ***	–0.026 ***	–0.025 ***	–0.025 ***
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	Relative education in years (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
	Resp. equal to partner		–0.056	–0.056	–0.032	–0.065	–0.065	–0.057	–0.056	–0.063	–0.059	–0.037	–0.035	–0.034
			(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.137)
	Resp. higher than partner		0.241 +	0.241 +	0.222 +	0.159	0.158	0.160	0.161	0.210	0.216	0.212	0.220	0.218
			(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)
	Missing information (from partner)		1.896 +	1.893 +	2.074 +	1.788	1.782	1.794	1.764	1.796	1.768	1.820 +	1.887 +	1.880 +
			(1.102)	(1.105)	(1.127)	(1.196)	(1.200)	(1.209)	(1.156)	(1.123)	(1.117)	(1.053)	(1.057)	(1.048)
	No partner interview		–0.045	–0.045	–0.063	–0.010	–0.016	0.028	0.017	0.038	0.047	0.057	0.036	0.015
			(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.163)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.192)
	Relative net income (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
	Resp. equal to partner		0.536 **	0.535 **	0.382 *	0.230	0.231	0.013	0.032	0.010	0.011	–0.039	–0.040	–0.043
			(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.172)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.203)	(0.204)
	Resp. higher than partner		–0.045	–0.045	–0.067	–0.026	–0.023	–0.240	–0.231	–0.196	–0.189	–0.191	–0.165	–0.158
			(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.134)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.173)
	Missing information (from partner)		–0.601 +	–0.601 +	–0.568 +	–0.450	–0.449	–0.559 +	–0.563 +	–0.568 +	–0.570 +	–0.595 +	–0.533 +	–0.518
			(0.309)	(0.309)	(0.304)	(0.310)	(0.309)	(0.313)	(0.316)	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.320)	(0.320)
	Own child in household			–0.014	0.085	0.108	0.125	0.127	0.125	0.128	0.129	0.157	0.124	0.122
				(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.114)

Table 2: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Respondent level													
Property ownership (ref.: No)													
Yes			−0.930 ***	−0.827 ***	−0.820 ***	−0.785 ***	−0.787 ***	−0.734 ***	−0.719 ***	−0.670 ***	−0.659 ***	−0.631 ***	
			(0.107)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.118)	
Does not apply			−0.278	−0.235	−0.246	−0.259	−0.248	−0.285	−0.255	−0.263	−0.220	−0.215	
			(0.326)	(0.327)	(0.327)	(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.318)	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.315)	(0.316)	
Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
Employed – Part time (>20h)				−0.084	−0.083	−0.120	−0.108	−0.080	−0.078	−0.053	−0.054	−0.060	
				(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	
Employed – Atypical				0.079	0.081	0.038	0.045	0.054	0.057	0.062	0.059	0.060	
				(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.161)	
Self-employed				0.142	0.138	0.089	0.091	0.246	0.252	0.281	0.269	0.272	
				(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.249)	
Unemployed (≤24 months)				0.470 *	0.471 *	0.335 +	0.321	0.352 +	0.356 +	0.328	0.334 +	0.334 +	
				(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.202)	
Unemployed (>24 months)				0.132	0.130	−0.066	−0.063	−0.076	−0.076	−0.116	−0.124	−0.122	
				(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.259)	(0.259)	
Inactive				−0.194	−0.184	−0.249	−0.257	−0.266	−0.271	−0.274	−0.379 +	−0.387 +	
				(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.208)	
Relative work experience (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
Resp. equal to partner				−0.209	−0.212	−0.188	−0.213	−0.125	−0.104	−0.116	−0.081	−0.092	
				(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.179)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.185)	
Resp. higher than partner				0.031	0.028	0.012	0.009	−0.014	−0.022	−0.017	−0.013	−0.014	
				(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.142)	
Missing information (from partner)				0.294	0.289	0.282	0.293	0.348	0.341	0.346	0.351	0.336	
				(0.255)	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.253)	(0.252)	(0.252)	
Relative Occupational Status (ISEI) (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
Resp. equal to partner				0.362 *	0.357 *	0.379 *	0.393 *	0.328 +	0.312 +	0.309 +	0.314 +	0.318 +	
				(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.182)	
Resp. higher than partner				0.022	0.023	0.044	0.044	0.021	0.021	0.010	−0.016	−0.008	
				(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.132)	
Missing information (from partner)				0.394 +	0.396 +	0.324	0.333	0.325	0.344	0.320	0.284	0.284	
				(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.225)	(0.223)	(0.223)	
Married and living together					−0.083	−0.089	−0.081	−0.015	−0.008	−0.013	−0.063	−0.074	
					(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.130)	

Table 2: (Continued)

	All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level	Employment status of partner (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
	Employed – Part time (>20h)						0.042	0.034	0.080	0.078	0.049	0.050	0.032	
							(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.188)	(0.186)	(0.187)	
	Employed – Atypical						0.009	0.014	0.065	0.053	0.076	0.062	0.062	
							(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.198)	
	Self-employed						0.126	0.116	0.133	0.121	0.077	0.054	0.053	
							(0.275)	(0.276)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.267)	(0.266)	(0.267)	
	Unemployed (≤24 months)						0.428 +	0.416 +	0.355	0.335	0.360	0.320	0.313	
							(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.242)	
	Unemployed (>24 months)						0.638 *	0.625 *	0.623 *	0.593 *	0.598 *	0.513 +	0.515 +	
							(0.295)	(0.295)	(0.297)	(0.296)	(0.295)	(0.293)	(0.293)	
	Inactive						0.299	0.293	0.249	0.233	0.227	0.152	0.150	
							(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.200)	
	Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)													
	Rarely							0.137	0.091	0.086	0.084	0.095	0.108	
								(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.157)	
	Sometimes							0.020	0.042	0.029	0.034	0.054	0.066	
								(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.156)	
	Often							0.045	0.027	0.006	−0.046	−0.003	0.006	
								(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.217)	
	Very frequent							0.664	0.709	0.688	0.638	0.694	0.692	
								(0.459)	(0.459)	(0.457)	(0.445)	(0.443)	(0.444)	
	Size of social network									−0.012 +	−0.009	−0.010	−0.010	
										(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
	Attachment to the place of residence										−0.226 ***	−0.227 ***	−0.228 ***	
											(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	
	Traditional family values (factor score)											0.233 ***	0.228 ***	
												(0.057)	(0.059)	

Table 2: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Regional level													
Community size (ref.: under 20,000)													
20,000–99,999													0.179
													(0.168)
100,000+													0.218
													(0.148)
Eastern Germany													–0.073
													(0.131)
Unemployment rate (gender, occup. group, federal state)													0.005
													(0.011)
Intercept	4.718 ***	6.154 ***	6.168 ***	5.882 ***	5.613 ***	5.610 ***	5.654 ***	5.579 ***	5.330 ***	5.374 ***	6.207 ***	5.831 ***	5.690 ***
	(0.183)	(0.298)	(0.321)	(0.317)	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.346)	(0.367)	(0.747)	(0.750)	(0.770)	(0.744)	(0.759)
Occupations	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142	11,142
Persons	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241	2,241
R^2 adjusted	0.162	0.178	0.178	0.191	0.195	0.195	0.196	0.197	0.212	0.212	0.217	0.22	0.22
BIC	57,548	57,397	57,406	57,235	57,282	57,290	57,324	57,351	57,741	57,740	57,686	57,652	57,682

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

Table 3: Willingness to relocate for a hypothetical job offer

	All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level	**Gender: Female**	**–0.269 *****	**–0.237 *****	**–0.235 *****	**–0.211 ****	**–0.197****	**–0.205 ****	**–0.222 ****	**–0.224 ****	**–0.233 ***	**–0.231 ***	**–0.239 ****	**–0.239 ****	**–0.229 ***
		(0.065)	**(0.067)**	**(0.067)**	**(0.066)**	**(0.074)**	**(0.074)**	**(0.076)**	**(0.077)**	**(0.096)**	**(0.095)**	**(0.091)**	**(0.090)**	**(0.091)**
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.028	0.031	0.027	0.063 *	0.063+	0.064 +	0.071 +	0.065 +	0.031	0.030	0.012	0.012	0.007
		(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)
	Age of respondent		–0.009 **	–0.008 *	–0.005	–0.005	–0.002	–0.002	–0.002	–0.004	–0.005	–0.004	–0.004	–0.003
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	Relative education in years (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
	Resp. equal to partner		–0.228 **	–0.229 **	–0.205 *	–0.203*	–0.20 *	–0.218 *	–0.211 *	–0.221 *	–0.223 *	–0.192 *	–0.192 *	–0.188 *
			(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.088)
	Resp. higher than partner		0.044	0.042	0.028	0.015	0.019	0.026	0.019	–0.049	–0.049	–0.082	–0.082	–0.097
			(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)
	Missing information (from partner)		0.563	0.564	0.585	0.544	0.537	0.578	0.614 +	0.719 +	0.718 +	0.886 +	0.886 +	0.908 *
			(0.379)	(0.384)	(0.394)	(0.403)	(0.380)	(0.379)	(0.351)	(0.386)	(0.381)	(0.458)	(0.459)	(0.451)
	No partner interview		0.194 +	0.193 +	0.133	0.155	0.146	0.164	0.167	0.128	0.119	0.170	0.171	0.165
			(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.139)
	Relative net income (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
	Resp. equal to partner		0.196 *	0.193 *	0.158 +	0.177*	0.176 *	0.124	0.112	0.151	0.137	0.023	0.023	0.022
			(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)
	Resp. higher than partner		0.285 **	0.285 **	0.266 **	0.252*	0.265 *	0.204	0.183	0.199	0.198	0.103	0.103	0.106
			(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.126)
	Missing information (from partner)		0.157	0.153	0.122	0.134	0.117	0.117	0.115	0.288	0.270	0.415	0.415	0.417
			(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.231)	(0.258)	(0.250)	(0.247)	(0.250)	(0.297)	(0.299)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.271)
	Own child in household			0.036	0.034	0.035	0.073	0.078	0.087	0.078	0.069	0.115	0.115	0.111
				(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)													
	Yes				–0.448 ***	–0.453***	–0.431 ***	–0.414 ***	–0.428 ***	–0.470 ***	–0.462 ***	–0.392 ***	–0.392 ***	–0.405 ***
					(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
	Does not apply				–0.075	–0.076	–0.124	–0.134	–0.155	–0.197	–0.187	–0.154	–0.154	–0.165
					(0.173)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.175)	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.181)

Table 3: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level													
Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
Employed – Part time (>20h)					0.054	0.069	0.077	0.088	0.075	0.066	0.029	0.028	0.001
					(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.182)
Employed – Atypical					0.068	0.074	0.063	0.075	0.118	0.116	0.103	0.103	0.085
					(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.149)
Self-employed					0.063	0.064	0.049	0.061	0.114	0.147	0.142	0.141	0.129
					(0.277)	(0.279)	(0.283)	(0.284)	(0.288)	(0.294)	(0.296)	(0.295)	(0.296)
Unemployed (≤24 months)					0.035	0.051	0.026	0.015	0.075	0.080	0.065	0.065	0.057
					(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Unemployed (>24 months)					–0.033	–0.031	–0.049	–0.063	0.000	0.011	–0.043	–0.042	–0.051
					(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Inactive					0.004	0.029	0.032	0.023	0.054	0.055	–0.006	–0.006	–0.012
					(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.161)
Relative work experience (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
Resp. equal to partner					–0.108	–0.10	–0.136	–0.121	–0.104	–0.100	–0.035	–0.034	–0.048
					(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.125)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.137)
Resp. higher than partner					0.053	0.048	0.055	0.055	0.085	0.088	0.080	0.080	0.079
					(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Missing information (from partner)					0.098	0.092	0.124	0.133	0.136	0.116	0.128	0.127	0.121
					(0.158)	(0.161)	(0.166)	(0.163)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.161)
Relative Occupational Status (ISEI) (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
Resp. equal to partner					–0.078	–0.084	–0.076	–0.074	–0.127	–0.127	–0.121	–0.121	–0.129
					(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Resp. higher than partner					0.057	0.062	0.041	0.039	–0.031	–0.033	–0.025	–0.025	–0.018
					(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Missing information (from partner)					–0.038	–0.025	–0.029	–0.008	–0.075	–0.061	–0.078	–0.078	–0.062
					(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.141)
Married and living together						–0.187 *	–0.195 *	–0.175 *	–0.159 +	–0.151 +	–0.162 *	–0.161 +	–0.151 +
						(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)

Table 3: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level													
Employment status of partner (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
Employed – Part time (>20h)							–0.053	–0.050	–0.056	–0.075	–0.089	–0.089	–0.085
							(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.137)
Employed – Atypical							0.050	0.058	–0.008	–0.024	0.077	0.077	0.062
							(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.129)
Self-employed							–0.016	–0.030	–0.114	–0.136	–0.198	–0.198	–0.198
							(0.180)	(0.178)	(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.193)
Unemployed (≤24 months)							0.254 +	0.276 +	0.195	0.173	0.274 +	0.274 +	0.275 +
							(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Unemployed (>24 months)							–0.049	–0.032	–0.101	–0.128	–0.008	–0.007	–0.003
							(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.167)
Inactive							0.043	0.058	0.024	0.003	0.047	0.047	0.037
							(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.154)	(0.156)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.146)
Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)													
Rarely								0.050	0.093	0.095	0.102	0.101	0.089
								(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Sometimes								–0.065	–0.053	–0.05	–0.043	–0.043	–0.052
								(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Often								0.231 +	0.259 +	0.243 +	0.234 +	0.233 +	0.217
								(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.132)
Very frequent								0.413 +	0.477 +	0.463 +	0.358	0.358	0.342
								(0.238)	(0.264)	(0.265)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.230)
Size of social network										–0.009 *	–0.007 +	–0.007 +	–0.006
										(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Attachment to the place of residence											–0.250 ***	–0.250 ***	–0.250 ***
											(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Traditional family values (factor score)												–0.001	–0.011
												(0.042)	(0.043)

Table 3: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Regional level													
Community size (ref.: under 20,000)													
20,000–99,999													0.066
													(0.106)
100,000+													0.025
													(0.099)
Eastern Germany													–0.011
													(0.082)
Unemployment rate (gender, occup. group, federal state)													–0.011 +
													(0.006)
Intercept	1.860 ***	2.100 ***	2.072 ***	1.971 ***	1.918***	1.889 ***	1.885 ***	1.846 ***	2.573 ***	2.679 ***	3.463 ***	3.465 ***	3.530 ***
	(0.072)	(0.182)	(0.195)	(0.197)	(0.246)	(0.244)	(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.480)	(0.482)	(0.523)	(0.527)	(0.529)
Occupations	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854
Persons	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854	854
R^2 adjusted	0.018	0.047	0.046	0.075	0.065	0.07	0.071	0.078	0.079	0.084	0.168	0.167	0.168
BIC	2,361	2,381	2,387	2,373	2,450	2,451	2,485	2,501	2,839	2,840	2,763	2,770	2,791

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

Table 4: Number of applications to interregional vacancies

All respondents with partner in household		Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level	**Gender: Female**	**–0.223***	**–0.218***	**–0.217***	**–0.221***	**–0.371*****	**–0.371*****	**–0.397*****	**–0.396*****	**–0.297***	**–0.298***	**–0.302***	**–0.348****	**–0.365****
		(0.095)	**(0.103)**	**(0.105)**	**(0.109)**	**(0.106)**	**(0.106)**	**(0.109)**	**(0.106)**	**(0.129)**	**(0.130)**	**(0.128)**	**(0.130)**	**(0.140)**
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.011	0.025	0.024	0.022	0.054	0.054	0.044	0.042	0.047	0.047	0.033	0.025	0.027
		(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)
	Age of respondent		–0.003	–0.003	–0.004	–0.003	–0.003	–0.003	–0.003	–0.006	–0.007	–0.006	–0.006	–0.007
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	Relative education in years (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
	Resp. equal to partner		0.070	0.069	0.069	0.012	0.012	–0.005	–0.006	–0.014	–0.017	0.017	–0.015	–0.031
			(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.131)
	Resp. higher than partner		0.279+	0.279*	0.283*	0.203	0.202	0.204	0.193	0.216+	0.216+	0.185	0.175	0.156
			(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.129)
	Missing information (from partner)		–0.270**	–0.269**	–0.278**	–0.252	–0.251	–0.208	–0.150	0.032	0.029	0.178	0.144	0.175
			(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.158)	(0.150)	(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.262)	(0.286)	(0.296)
	No partner interview		0.244*	0.244*	0.249*	0.247	0.247	0.127	0.139	0.212	0.200	0.241	0.278	0.298
			(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.210)	(0.206)	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.226)	(0.228)
	Relative net income (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
	Resp. equal to partner		0.220+	0.219+	0.220	0.357*	0.358*	0.487*	0.486*	0.591**	0.577**	0.481*	0.518*	0.522*
			(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.221)	(0.219)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.220)
	Resp. higher than partner		0.123	0.123	0.123	0.278+	0.278+	0.398+	0.386+	0.443*	0.441*	0.380+	0.380+	0.368+
			(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.206)
	Missing information (from partner)		–0.215*	–0.215*	–0.218*	0.079	0.080	0.088	0.083	0.145	0.126	0.265	0.255	0.212
			(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.156)	(0.152)	(0.185)	(0.179)	(0.193)	(0.186)	(0.192)
	Own child in household			0.004	0.003	–0.018	–0.019	0.010	0.027	0.064	0.052	0.088	0.112	0.103
				(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.108)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)													
	Yes				0.007	–0.009	–0.010	–0.039	–0.044	–0.040	–0.033	0.017	0.015	–0.054
					(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)
	Does not apply				–0.117	–0.106	–0.104	–0.126	–0.133	–0.234	–0.221	–0.205	–0.225	–0.234
					(0.155)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.150)	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.215)	(0.218)	(0.219)

Table 4: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level													
Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
Employed – Part time (>20h)					0.523	0.523	0.505	0.503	0.397 +	0.387	0.413+	0.396+	0.428+
					(0.398)	(0.397)	(0.359)	(0.361)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.240)
Employed – Atypical					0.219*	0.219 *	0.220 *	0.230 *	0.180	0.182	0.198	0.203	0.207
					(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.142)
Self-employed					0.740*	0.740 *	0.671 *	0.690 *	0.727 *	0.752*	0.784*	0.740*	0.783*
					(0.290)	(0.290)	(0.298)	(0.297)	(0.330)	(0.331)	(0.324)	(0.325)	(0.330)
Unemployed (≤24 months)					0.460***	0.460 ***	0.508 ***	0.486 ***	0.444 **	0.454**	0.474**	0.468***	0.475**
					(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.148)
Unemployed (>24 months)					0.139	0.139	0.220	0.202	0.185	0.200	0.179	0.213	0.215
					(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.153)
Inactive					0.500 +	0.499 +	0.547 +	0.535 +	0.530	0.536+	0.522	0.604+	0.624+
					(0.284)	(0.282)	(0.285)	(0.289)	(0.324)	(0.325)	(0.317)	(0.339)	(0.346)
Relative work experience (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
Resp. equal to partner					–0.427**	–0.428 **	–0.435 **	–0.424 **	–0.375 *	–0.367*	–0.301+	–0.286+	–0.314+
					(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.167)
Resp. higher than partner					–0.265+	–0.265 +	–0.250	–0.252	–0.134	–0.128	–0.131	–0.120	–0.102
					(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.160)
Missing information (from partner)					0.132	0.133	0.139	0.138	0.231	0.209	0.230	0.233	0.242
					(0.244)	(0.245)	(0.251)	(0.247)	(0.235)	(0.238)	(0.233)	(0.230)	(0.237)
Relative Occupational Status (ISEI) (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)													
Resp. equal to partner					0.001	0.001	0.022	0.021	0.106	0.103	0.117	0.085	0.087
					(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Resp. higher than partner					0.278*	0.277 *	0.253 +	0.258 +	0.272	0.265	0.272+	0.266	0.269
					(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.166)
Missing information (from partner)					–0.072	–0.073	–0.036	–0.021	–0.093	–0.082	–0.089	–0.083	–0.078
					(0.163)	(0.165)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.190)
Married and living together						0.008	0.009	0.017	–0.001	0.008	–0.008	0.026	0.047
						(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.124)

Table 4: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Employment status of partner (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
Employed – Part time (>20h)							–0.160	–0.151	–0.105	–0.130	–0.116	–0.116	–0.119
							(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.176)
Employed – Atypical							–0.285 *	–0.259 +	–0.388 *	–0.403*	–0.322*	–0.300 +	–0.293+
							(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.159)
Self-employed							0.535	0.547	0.430	0.406	0.341	0.322	0.363
							(0.716)	(0.690)	(0.509)	(0.510)	(0.499)	(0.498)	(0.499)
Unemployed (≤24 months)							–0.138	–0.113	–0.229	–0.256	–0.180	–0.159	–0.142
							(0.216)	(0.218)	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.217)
Unemployed (>24 months)							–0.518 *	–0.495 *	–0.649 **	–0.684**	–0.588*	–0.534 *	–0.535*
							(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.249)	(0.250)	(0.248)	(0.245)	(0.247)
Inactive							–0.301	–0.276	–0.332	–0.358+	–0.329	–0.303	–0.314
							(0.199)	(0.202)	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.216)	(0.220)
Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)													
Rarely								–0.070	–0.109	–0.106	–0.099	–0.112	–0.107
								(0.145)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Sometimes								–0.179	–0.273 *	–0.269*	–0.261*	–0.282 *	–0.280*
								(0.124)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Often								0.002	–0.148	–0.166	–0.166	–0.200	–0.209
								(0.242)	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.189)	(0.193)	(0.193)
Very frequent								0.148	0.140	0.124	0.029	–0.031	–0.029
								(0.335)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.346)	(0.351)	(0.340)
Size of social network										–0.011+	–0.009	–0.010	–0.009
										(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Attachment to the place of residence											–0.225***	–0.228 ***	–0.218***
											(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.064)
Traditional family values (factor score)												–0.203 *	–0.194*
												(0.087)	(0.084)

Table 4: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household		Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
		b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Regional level	Community size (ref.: under 20,000)													
	20,000–99,999													–0.135
														(0.240)
	100,000+													–0.330
														(0.207)
	Eastern Germany													0.074
														(0.120)
	Unemployment rate (gender, occup. group, federal state)													–0.017*
														(0.008)
Intercept		0.407***	0.301	0.297	0.322	0.000	0.001	0.106	0.179	–0.173	–0.046	0.601+	0.973*	1.183*
		(0.098)	(0.224)	(0.230)	(0.242)	(0.302)	(0.296)	(0.312)	(0.315)	(0.329)	(0.341)	(0.355)	(0.423)	(0.493)
Occupations		No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
Persons		929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
R^2 adjusted		0.004	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.018	0.017	0.023	0.021	0.034	0.037	0.065	0.077	0.083
BIC		3,373	3,419	3,426	3,439	3,493	3,500	3,529	3,554	3,892	3,896	3,874	3,868	3,884

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

4.1 Are there gender differences in willingness to move?

Tables 2 to 4 display the results for our three dependent variables – willingness in the vignette experiment, general willingness to relocate, and actual application behavior, respectively. Looking at the zero models without controls – or only the randomly assigned dimensions in case of the vignette design in Table 2 – we find a significant, negative 'raw' effect for women for all three dependent variables.

A first look at the effect of additional controls reveals that this effect is quite stable across various models. For the factorial survey experiment, where all respondents available to the labor market[9] were asked to evaluate the hypothetical job offers, women tend to rate the job offers roughly a third to half of a scale point lower than men rate these offers. For the general willingness of job searchers with cohabiting partners to relocate for a new job (Table 3), a stable negative effect in the range of –.2 to –.25 is found for women. The two previous results represent stated hypothetical behavior; additionally, the reported interregional application behavior displayed in Table 4 points to a lower proneness to mobility of women in partnerships. Women report roughly .2 to .4 fewer such applications than men. All of these differences are significant at the 5% level. In addition, these results were confirmed by the Constance–Berne vignette survey (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010), where women in dual-career partnerships also found transregional job offers to be less attractive than did men. Together, we take these findings as strong evidence for Hypothesis 1.

In contrast to the above results for women with partners, women without partners did not differ from men in their mobility behavior after controls were introduced. The results are displayed in the Appendix in Tables A-3, A-4, and A-5. The gender effect that is negative for female respondents in all model specifications in Tables 2 to 4 is nonsignificant and close to zero for willingness to move and interregional applications in all models that include at least age and household income as controls. For the vignette item, single women also showed less willingness to accept the job offer than men (–.2 to –.4 points on the 11-point scale), but this effect dropped below –.2 and became nonsignificant after occupations were controlled for. We conclude that cohabitating with a partner influences women and men differently regarding labor market mobility preferences.

[9] For the main analyses, we chose to present the results of the factorial survey experiment for all respondents who received the question. In contrast to the two other dependent variables, this group included not only job seekers in the last four weeks before the interview but also everyone who was available to the labor market (employed or unemployed). We ran a sensitivity analysis that we present in Table A-7 in the Appendix. The absolute size of the gender coefficient was not reduced when including only job seekers. In addition, we deleted vignettes that might be considered less plausible, such as fixed-term contracts for respondents, with permanent contracts and part-time offers for the full-time employed. This also did not reduce the absolute size of the coefficient for gender (compare Table A-6 in the Appendix). All sensitivity checks are based on the final model specification (model 12).

4.2 Mechanisms explaining the gender differences in willingness to move

4.2.1 Quality of job offers

In a second step, we looked at several mechanisms that should explain the general tendency to relocate for a job and checked whether gender differences persist after controlling for these factors. Hypothesis 2a indicates that additional earnings or better career options increase willingness to move. Here, the vignette instrument is most suited to test this hypothesis. Table 2 shows that the increase in household income due to the new job as well as having strong prospects of promotion lead to a higher willingness to accept the job.

If different labor market positions of women compared to men are responsible for the gender gap in willingness to move for a new job (e.g., a higher share of part-time employment or employment in regionally dispersed jobs), then gender differences should disappear after controlling for these attributes. However, the factorial survey experiment included details of the job offer characteristics that were independent of the individual characteristics of the respondents. Therefore, women were presented with attractive job offers that were identical to those of men and were independent of their labor market biographies. Still, Table 2 showed a robust and more negative assessment of willingness to accept job offers by women, even though a large number of important job offer characteristics were controlled. This was also true for the comparable Constance–Berne vignette study, which confirmed our findings on the basis of a different sample (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010). These findings lend support to Hypothesis 2a. However, as an explanation of the gender difference, we can rule out these structural effects of the labor market and, thus, have to reject Hypothesis 3a.

Beyond these mechanisms, a standard argument indicates that the losses of the tied mover must be overcompensated by the gains of the person initiating the move (Auspurg, Frodermann, and Hinz 2014). One argument for gender differences in mobility might be that men usually have higher incomes than women and, thus, men's incomes are more difficult to compensate. However, the vignettes controlled for the mobility gains for the household, and gender effects remained significant.

4.2.2 Local embeddedness and costs of moving

In Hypothesis 2b we focused on the local embeddedness of a person, assuming that higher embeddedness will lead to a lower willingness to move for the new job. To measure social embeddedness, we relied on three measures: the size of the local network, attachment to the place of residence, and the presence of children in the

household. For all three dependent variables, we observed a similar pattern (compare model 10 in Tables 2 through 4): Attachment to the place of residence had a significantly negative effect on mobility, and the size of the network presented a negative sign in all models but was significant only until attachment to the place of residence was controlled for. The presence of children had no effect on the dependent variables.

Altogether, these results support Hypothesis 2b, insofar as local attachment as a mechanism is concerned. However, network effects seem to be captured by the subjective evaluation variable rather than by network size.

Nevertheless, based on a comparison of models with and without these variables in all three-model series, we conclude that these factors do not alter the negative mobility effect for women. Similarly, no changes were found in the Constance–Berne vignette study when information on marriage or children was controlled for (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010: 886). Consequently, we can rule out the explanation of gender-specific moving costs (Hypothesis 3b).

4.2.3 Collective decision-making at the household level

Finally, women in partnerships could be disadvantaged by the household's collective decision process, either due to the lower bargaining power of women in a partnership or because of gender norms that favor male over female employment.

Regarding the first type of explanation, the collective decision of the household can be influenced by unequal bargaining power within couples. If women have less bargaining power than men on average, and if women consequently anticipate a lower possibility of asserting their preferences, their willingness to move should be lower than that of their partners. Bargaining power can be defined by two concepts. First, it can be measured by the resources a person contributes to the partnership that are important to the partner (Blood and Wolfe 1960). In this sense, the personal income contributed to the household is a measure of bargaining power. Second, bargaining power increases with better outside options compared to the partnership (Bernasco and Giesen 2000; Ott 1992). Within this concept, bargaining power especially increases with the potential to earn money for oneself, thus decreasing dependency on the partner's income. We try to cover both bargaining concepts by including a set of control variables measuring relative labor market resources within the couple, including relative education, relative income, relative work experience, and relative occupational status. Hypothesis 3c states that the gender difference in willingness to move will decrease if these variables are controlled for. A first look at the direct effects of these variables in the vignettes shows inconsistent effects between the different dependent variables and model specifications:

For vignette acceptance, relative education has no effect, and relative income has an effect only in the expected direction until employment status, work experience, and occupational status are controlled for. Relative work experience and relative occupational status have no significant effect. For willingness to relocate, the education effect is significant in the direction opposing the hypothesis: Respondents with equal education to their partners are less likely to relocate than respondents with lower education than their partner. The income effect is significant in the expected direction until the employment status of the partner is controlled for and is nonsignificant in all subsequent models. Relative work experience and relative occupational status again have no effect. Concerning the number of applications to interregional vacancies, having an equal or higher net income than the partner increases the number of applications compared to having a lower income, while surprisingly, having equal work experience decreases the number of applications compared to having less work experience. For the other relative variables, any significant effects vanish after introducing controls for local embeddedness.

Overall, there is at best weak evidence for the bargaining argument as stated in Hypothesis 2c. Moreover, regarding Hypothesis 3c, we see that none of these variables reduce the effect of gender for either willingness to relocate or application behavior (Tables 2 through 4, models 1 through 4). Consequently, we find scarce support for the assumption that gender-specific bargaining power is responsible for the gender differences in willingness to move (Hypothesis 3c). This result is supported by the results of Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz (2010), who controlled for the relative bargaining power in a partnership via a mirrored design and still observed a persistent gender effect on willingness to move.

A final explanation for gender differences in willingness to move is adherence to gender norms that place the burden of reconciling work and family life on the woman's shoulders and demand that women should prioritize family duties over pursuing a career.

Here, we assumed a negative effect of traditional norms on women's willingness to move (Hypothesis $2d_1$) and a positive effect of traditional norms for men (Hypothesis $2d_2$). To test this assumption, we need to include a main effect of traditional gender norm attitudes as well as an interaction effect between gender and traditional norms. Table 5 displays the slope coefficients of the gender norm factor for men and women separately. These interactions are derived from a model that adds an interaction effect to the full model specification, now including the main effect of traditional gender roles (model 12 in all three tables).

Table 5: Conditional effects of traditional family norms, by gender

Traditional family values (mean standardized factor score)	Vignette job offer acceptance b/se	General willingness to relocate b/se	Interregional applications b/se
Male	0.341 ***	0.032	–0.121 +
	(0.080)	(0.057)	(0.067)
Female	0.084	–0.071	–0.288 +
	(0.084)	(0.061)	(0.161)
Observations	11,142	854	929
Persons	2,241	854	929

Note: (Cluster-)robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

Figure 2: Conditional effects of traditional family norms, by gender



We observed no significant effects of the gender norm factor for men or women, with the exception of the clear result for men in the factorial survey experiment. Here, the positive slope for men indicated that men who agree to traditional gender norms exhibit a greater willingness to move than their more progressive counterparts. This points to male self-conception as a breadwinner, and this evidence is in line with the argument of Hypothesis $2d_1$.

The question of whether the gender norms can explain the observed gender differences, at least in part, can be best addressed with a graphic representation. Figure 2 displays predicted values for men and women over the distribution of the traditional gender norm factor for each of our three dependent variables. The slope of this interaction effect provides information on the gender-specific effects of norms, while the distance between men and women on the y-axis provides evidence for Hypothesis 3d, that gender-specific norms explain the differences between genders.

Again, the pattern is very similar for all three dependent variables. On the right end – depicting combinations of conservative role attitudes for men and women – there is a significantly lower willingness to move for women than for men. However, gender differences in regional mobility vanish when both partners reject traditional gender roles. At the leftmost position (both partners strongly reject traditional gender roles), the sign even switches. However, due to the small number of cases corresponding to each value of traditional gender roles, this reversed gender effect never becomes significant. Thus, there is at least partial evidence for Hypothesis 3d.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we focused on gender differences in willingness to make a long-distance move for a better job offer. By considering willingness to move, we are able to overcome the problem of household moves being a rare and highly selective event, which conceals the extent of unequal preferences between men and women. Against this background, we answered three questions: First, is there an unconditional gender difference in willingness to move for a better job? Second, what are the determinants that favor or hamper a long-distance move? Third, how do these determinants contribute to the explanation of gender differences in willingness to move?

To tackle these questions empirically, we use data from the PASS panel study, which provides up to 2,400 respondents for our questions. Moreover, the survey is unique in including a factorial survey experiment addressing hypothetical interregional job offers. By assigning job offers randomly to men and women with this design, we overcome the problem of gender differences potentially being the result of different job market structures for men and women. This rich instrument is supplemented first by a

general question about willingness to relocate, which allows comparison to an early study in this field (Markham and Pleck 1986). Second, we employ data on actual behavior by considering the interregional application behavior of job seekers.

We find that coupled women show a considerably lower willingness to move for a better interregional job offer compared to coupled men. In addition, this difference in attitude is mirrored by differences in actual behavior, as women also report fewer interregional applications than men. Interestingly, we find no gender effect for singles or coupled persons living in separate households. This leads to the conclusion that gender differences in willingness to move are an effect of the couple's joint household. Regarding our second question, we find – consistent with theoretical arguments – that willingness to move increases with the rising benefits of relocation. Variables representing local embeddedness – and therefore the costs of a move – hamper the attractiveness of an interregional job offer.

Regarding our third question, we can rule out by design the possibility that the gender effect regarding willingness to move is the result of better job offers for men. In our factorial design instrument, men and women randomly receive the same job offers, on average. Moreover, we did not find any effects of local embeddedness or bargaining power on the gender difference in willingness to move. Including these variables, as well as further controls, does not change the significant gender effect. This result of a persistent gender gap concerning willingness to move is in accordance with early findings for the United States by Markham and Pleck (1986) and the results of Shauman, who showed that different occupational positions of men and women did not contribute to explaining migration (Shauman 2010). By comparing coupled respondents with singles, we were able to show that this persistent gender effect is the result of a joint household. Living together clearly reduces willingness to move for a better job for women more than for men.

However, concerning the gender gap in willingness to move for a new job, we found at least some explanatory power of the gender norms. If we look at the subgroup of egalitarian men and women, we find no gender difference in willingness to move, whereas respondents with more traditional values show a persistent gender gap. Beyond this finding, the causal mechanism for the persistent gender gap is still unclear because none of the available measures of opportunities, costs, or norms alleviated this gender effect. One explanation that we could not test extensively assumes that women anticipate being dependent on a local support structure sooner or later – whether for the care of children or the elderly. This would result in a lower willingness to move when entering a household with a partner. However, women would have to expect a sufficiently low probability of separation to make this behavior rational.

These findings lead to two main conclusions of our study. First, women show a persistently lower willingness to move for an interregional job offer than men. Second,

the gender difference is triggered by joining a household with a male partner. This finding relates to various debates regarding the household and the labor market. First, because interregional job mobility is related to better and more stable jobs and higher income, this finding contributes to explaining the persistent gender inequality in the labor market. Hence, although lower wages for women do not explain the gender differences in willingness to move, the gendered mobility pattern fuels the gender pay gap by restricting women to local labor markets (Cooke 2003; Lehmer and Ludsteck 2011; Shihadeh 1991; Yankow 2003). Second, our results shed new light on the question of when households become mobile. It is well known that couples and families move their households less often than single individuals. Existing explanations for this difference focus mainly on the coordination and transaction costs of a move, which rise with the number of household members. However, beyond these determinants, our results show that women seem to be more sensitive to these costs than men. Third, our findings contribute to our understanding of the gendered structure of mobility decisions in households (Bielby and Bielby 1992; Cooke 2003). Existing studies have focused primarily on women as tied movers, explaining the disadvantaged position of women as a consequence of a forced move (Blackburn 2009, 2010; Boyle et al. 2003; Geist and McManus 2012). However, our results show that women tend to reject profitable moves more than men and that this is at least partly due to gendered attitudes. More traditional attitudes toward the family lead to fewer female tied movers (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010) but more female rejectors. Although this may be the result of a weaker preference for labor market integration of women (Trzcinski and Holst 2012), it is still unclear why the preferences of women and men differ. The persistent effect of gender concerning willingness to move remains a puzzle, and further research should try to reveal more causal mechanisms for this effect.

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Appendix

Table A-1: Sample selection

Dependent variables	Acceptance of vignette job offer	General willingness to move	Interregional applications
PASS wave 5	N = 15,607 persons (8,249 CAPI, 7,358 CATI)		
Aged 15–65	N = 13,894 persons (7,330 CAPI, 6,564 CATI)		
Administered to	All employed or unemployed persons in the CAPI part	All job searchers except those looking for an additional second job	All job searchers
	N = 4,813 persons	N = 2,625 persons	N = 2,858 persons
	N = 24,065 vignettes		
In household with partner	N = 2,680 persons	N = 1,527 persons	N = 2,740 persons
	N = 13,400 vignettes		
No missing covariate information	N = 2,241persons	N = 1,536 persons	N = 1,760 persons
	N = 11,142 vignettes		

Table A-2: Descriptive statistics for the smallest sample population

Respondents with partner in household		Total				Male				Female			
		m	sd	min	max	m	sd	min	max	m	sd	min	max
Vignette level	Percentage increase in household income												
	+ 0	0.11	0.31	0	1	0.11	0.31	0	1	0.10	0.31	0	1
	+ 10	0.03	0.17	0	1	0.03	0.18	0	1	0.03	0.16	0	1
	+ 15	0.03	0.16	0	1	0.03	0.18	0	1	0.02	0.15	0	1
	+ 20	0.12	0.32	0	1	0.12	0.32	0	1	0.12	0.32	0	1
	+ 30	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.14	0.34	0	1	0.13	0.34	0	1
	+ 40	0.17	0.38	0	1	0.16	0.37	0	1	0.19	0.39	0	1
	+ 45	0.09	0.28	0	1	0.08	0.28	0	1	0.09	0.29	0	1
	+ 60	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.21	0.41	0	1
	+ 80	0.11	0.31	0	1	0.11	0.31	0	1	0.11	0.31	0	1
	Weekly working hours												
	20 hours	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.24	0.43	0	1
	30 hours	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.25	0.44	0	1
	40 hours	0.50	0.50	0	1	0.50	0.50	0	1	0.50	0.50	0	1
	Level of over-qualification												
	None	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1
	Slight	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1
	Considerable	0.35	0.48	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.35	0.48	0	1
	Prospects of promotion												
	None	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1
	Few	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1
	Many	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1
	Duration of employment												
	Permanent employment	0.35	0.48	0	1	0.35	0.48	0	1	0.36	0.48	0	1
	Temporary, 1-year contract	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.46	0	1
	Temporary, 3-year contract	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1

Table A-2: (Continued)

Respondents with partner in household		Total				Male				Female			
		m	sd	min	max	m	sd	min	max	m	sd	min	max
Vignette level	Commuting distance (one-way)												
	1 hour	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.48	0	1
	4 hours	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.31	0.46	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1
	6 hours	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.35	0.48	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1
	Local employment opportunities												
	Worse than place of residence	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1
	Similar	0.35	0.48	0	1	0.35	0.48	0	1	0.35	0.48	0	1
	Better	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1
	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation												
	Very easy	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1
	With some effort	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.34	0.48	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1
	With considerable effort	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1
	Acceptance of vignette job offer	3.34	3.62	0	10	3.47	3.65	0	10	3.18	3.57	0	10
Respondent level	**Willingness to relocate for a hypothetical job offer**	1.91	1.05	1	4	2.03	1.07	1	4	1.78	1.01	1	4
	Number of applications to interregional vacancies	0.36	1.79	0	30	0.47	1.75	0	25	0.23	1.82	0	30
	Household income in 1,000 euros	1.36	1.01	0	9	1.29	0.96	0	8	1.43	1.06	0	9
	Age of respondent	41.25	10.15	18	58	41.10	10.26	19	58	41.42	10.04	18	58
	Relative education in years												
	Resp. lower than partner	0.11	0.31	0	1	0.14	0.35	0	1	0.08	0.27	0	1
	Resp. equal to partner	0.11	0.31	0	1	0.12	0.32	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1
	Resp. higher than partner	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.13	0.33	0	1
	Missing information (from partner)	0.00	0.06	0	1	0.00	0.06	0	1	0.00	0.05	0	1
	No partner interview	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.60	0.49	0	1	0.69	0.46	0	1
	Relative net income												
	Resp. lower than partner	0.13	0.33	0	1	0.12	0.32	0	1	0.14	0.34	0	1
	Resp. equal to partner	0.14	0.35	0	1	0.17	0.37	0	1	0.12	0.33	0	1
	Resp. higher than partner	0.08	0.27	0	1	0.11	0.31	0	1	0.05	0.21	0	1
	Missing information (from partner)	0.01	0.08	0	1	0.01	0.08	0	1	0.01	0.09	0	1
	No partner interview	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.60	0.49	0	1	0.69	0.46	0	1
	Own child in household	0.45	0.50	0	1	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.57	0.50	0	1
	Property ownership												
	No	0.86	0.35	0	1	0.86	0.35	0	1	0.85	0.36	0	1
	Yes	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.09	0.28	0	1	0.12	0.32	0	1
	Does not apply	0.04	0.20	0	1	0.06	0.23	0	1	0.03	0.17	0	1
	Employment status												
	Employed – Full time	0.07	0.25	0	1	0.08	0.27	0	1	0.06	0.24	0	1
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	0.03	0.18	0	1	0.01	0.11	0	1	0.06	0.23	0	1
	Employed – Atypical	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1
	Self-employed	0.01	0.08	0	1	0.01	0.09	0	1	0.00	0.07	0	1
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	0.44	0.50	0	1	0.48	0.50	0	1	0.41	0.49	0	1
	Unemployed (>24 months)	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.32	0.47	0	1	0.27	0.45	0	1
	Inactive	0.05	0.21	0	1	0.01	0.08	0	1	0.09	0.29	0	1

Table A-2: (Continued)

Respondents with partner in household		Total				Male				Female			
		m	sd	min	max	m	sd	min	max	m	sd	min	max
Respondent level	Relative work experience												
	Resp. lower than partner	0.15	0.36	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.20	0.40	0	1
	Resp. equal to partner	0.02	0.14	0	1	0.02	0.14	0	1	0.02	0.15	0	1
	Resp. higher than partner	0.16	0.36	0	1	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.06	0.23	0	1
	Missing information (from partner)	0.03	0.17	0	1	0.03	0.17	0	1	0.03	0.16	0	1
	No partner interview	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.60	0.49	0	1	0.69	0.46	0	1
	Relative ISEI												
	Resp. lower than partner	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.13	0.34	0	1
	Resp. equal to partner	0.04	0.20	0	1	0.04	0.21	0	1	0.03	0.18	0	1
	Resp. higher than partner	0.13	0.33	0	1	0.13	0.33	0	1	0.13	0.33	0	1
	Missing information (from partner)	0.06	0.23	0	1	0.09	0.29	0	1	0.02	0.13	0	1
	No partner interview	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.60	0.49	0	1	0.69	0.46	0	1
	Married and living together	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.28	0.45	0	1
	Employment status of partner												
	Employed – Full time	0.06	0.24	0	1	0.04	0.19	0	1	0.09	0.28	0	1
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	0.03	0.18	0	1	0.06	0.23	0	1	0.01	0.08	0	1
	Employed – Atypical	0.03	0.18	0	1	0.04	0.19	0	1	0.03	0.18	0	1
	Self-employed	0.01	0.10	0	1	0.01	0.09	0	1	0.01	0.10	0	1
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	0.07	0.26	0	1	0.07	0.26	0	1	0.07	0.26	0	1
	Unemployed (>24 months)	0.05	0.22	0	1	0.05	0.22	0	1	0.05	0.22	0	1
	Inactive	0.09	0.29	0	1	0.14	0.34	0	1	0.05	0.22	0	1
	No partner interview	0.07	0.26	0	1	0.06	0.24	0	1	0.09	0.28	0	1
	No partner	0.57	0.50	0	1	0.54	0.50	0	1	0.60	0.49	0	1
	Conflict with household												
	Very rare or never	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.08	0.28	0	1	0.12	0.33	0	1
	Rarely	0.20	0.40	0	1	0.18	0.39	0	1	0.21	0.41	0	1
	Sometimes	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.22	0.42	0	1	0.28	0.45	0	1
	Often	0.09	0.28	0	1	0.05	0.22	0	1	0.13	0.33	0	1
	Very frequent	0.02	0.15	0	1	0.02	0.14	0	1	0.03	0.16	0	1
	Single-person household	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.44	0.50	0	1	0.23	0.42	0	1
	Size of social network	6.12	7.13	0	99	6.45	8.02	0	99	5.76	5.99	0	50
	Attachment to the place of residence	3.67	1.19	1	5	3.67	1.19	1	5	3.67	1.19	1	5
	Traditional family values (factor score)	1.55	0.90	–0.01	3.93	1.63	0.92	–0.01	3.93	1.47	0.87	–0.01	3.93
Regional level	Community size												
	under 20,000	0.12	0.32	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.13	0.34	0	1
	20,000–99,999	0.24	0.43	0	1	0.26	0.44	0	1	0.22	0.42	0	1
	100,000+	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.64	0.48	0	1	0.64	0.48	0	1
	Eastern Germany	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.36	0.48	0	1
	Unemployment rate (gender, occup. group, federal state)	13.45	10.53	0.00	61.20	13.14	10.75	0.00	61.20	13.81	10.29	0.00	49.20
Observations		4,895				2,575				2,320			
Persons		986				518				468			

Table A-3: Acceptance of vignette job offer

All respondents without partner	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Vignette level													
Percentage increase in household income	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.028 *** (0.002)	0.027 *** (0.002)	0.027 *** (0.002)	0.027 *** (0.002)	0.027 *** (0.002)	0.027 *** (0.002)
Weekly working hours (ref.: 20 hours)													
30 hours	−0.228 + (0.123)	−0.213 + (0.123)	−0.214 + (0.123)	−0.217 + (0.123)	−0.219 + (0.123)	−0.219 + (0.123)	−0.219 + (0.123)	−0.223 + (0.123)	−0.200 (0.122)	−0.203 + (0.122)	−0.199 (0.122)	−0.198 (0.122)	−0.201 + (0.121)
40 hours	−0.593 *** (0.114)	−0.544 *** (0.114)	−0.546 *** (0.114)	−0.550 *** (0.114)	−0.551 *** (0.114)	−0.551 *** (0.114)	−0.551 *** (0.114)	−0.553 *** (0.114)	−0.532 *** (0.113)	−0.536 *** (0.113)	−0.538 *** (0.113)	−0.534 *** (0.113)	−0.539 *** (0.113)
Level of over-qualification (ref.: None)													
Slight	−0.159 (0.099)	−0.136 (0.097)	−0.136 (0.098)	−0.137 (0.098)	−0.141 (0.097)	−0.141 (0.097)	−0.141 (0.097)	−0.146 (0.097)	−0.145 (0.096)	−0.144 (0.096)	−0.141 (0.097)	−0.146 (0.096)	−0.147 (0.096)
Considerable	−0.351 *** (0.102)	−0.338 *** (0.101)	−0.338 *** (0.101)	−0.340 *** (0.100)	−0.335 *** (0.100)	−0.335 *** (0.100)	−0.335 *** (0.100)	−0.332 *** (0.100)	−0.335 *** (0.099)	−0.336 *** (0.099)	−0.335 *** (0.099)	−0.338 *** (0.099)	−0.334 *** (0.099)
Prospects of promotion (ref.: None)													
Few	−0.110 (0.099)	−0.113 (0.098)	−0.111 (0.098)	−0.112 (0.098)	−0.118 (0.098)	−0.118 (0.098)	−0.118 (0.098)	−0.123 (0.098)	−0.138 (0.096)	−0.139 (0.096)	−0.137 (0.096)	−0.140 (0.096)	−0.132 (0.096)
Many	0.351 *** (0.105)	0.368 *** (0.103)	0.370 *** (0.103)	0.370 *** (0.103)	0.368 *** (0.103)	0.368 *** (0.103)	0.368 *** (0.103)	0.365 *** (0.102)	0.369 *** (0.100)	0.368 *** (0.100)	0.364 *** (0.100)	0.363 *** (0.100)	0.366 *** (0.100)
Duration of employment (ref.: Permanent employment)													
Temporary, 1 year contract	−0.855 *** (0.105)	−0.880 *** (0.104)	−0.880 *** (0.104)	−0.886 *** (0.104)	−0.884 *** (0.104)	−0.884 *** (0.104)	−0.884 *** (0.104)	−0.880 *** (0.103)	−0.844 *** (0.103)	−0.845 *** (0.103)	−0.849 *** (0.103)	−0.847 *** (0.103)	−0.842 *** (0.103)
Temporary, 3 year contract	−0.493 *** (0.104)	−0.524 *** (0.103)	−0.524 *** (0.103)	−0.529 *** (0.103)	−0.526 *** (0.103)	−0.526 *** (0.103)	−0.526 *** (0.103)	−0.526 *** (0.103)	−0.501 *** (0.102)	−0.502 *** (0.102)	−0.502 *** (0.102)	−0.504 *** (0.102)	−0.505 *** (0.102)
Commuting distance (ref.: 1 hour 1-way))													
4 hours	−2.316 *** (0.125)	−2.305 *** (0.123)	−2.304 *** (0.123)	−2.305 *** (0.123)	−2.304 *** (0.123)	−2.304 *** (0.123)	−2.304 *** (0.123)	−2.299 *** (0.123)	−2.287 *** (0.122)	−2.284 *** (0.122)	−2.290 *** (0.122)	−2.289 *** (0.122)	−2.300 *** (0.122)
6 hours	−2.613 *** (0.120)	−2.601 *** (0.119)	−2.600 *** (0.119)	−2.597 *** (0.119)	−2.598 *** (0.119)	−2.598 *** (0.119)	−2.598 *** (0.119)	−2.593 *** (0.119)	−2.580 *** (0.117)	−2.578 *** (0.117)	−2.583 *** (0.117)	−2.582 *** (0.117)	−2.587 *** (0.117)

Table A-3: (Continued)

All respondents without partner		Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Vignette level	Local employment opportunities (ref.: Worse than place of residence)													
	Similar	0.590 ***	0.551 ***	0.551 ***	0.549 ***	0.552***	0.552 ***	0.552***	0.549 ***	0.553 ***	0.555***	0.553 ***	0.552***	0.557***
		(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
	Better	0.317 **	0.280 **	0.281 **	0.284 **	0.285**	0.285 **	0.285**	0.284 **	0.305 **	0.308**	0.305 **	0.305**	0.303**
		(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation (ref.: Very easy)													
	With some effort	–0.211 +	–0.245 *	–0.247 *	–0.249 *	–0.255*	–0.255 *	–0.255*	–0.257 *	–0.267 *	–0.269 **	–0.264 *	–0.263*	–0.256 *
		(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.103)
	With considerable effort	–0.415 ***	–0.443 ***	–0.443 ***	–0.442***	–0.444***	–0.444 ***	–0.444***	–0.444 ***	–0.457***	–0.459***	–0.458 ***	–0.457***	–0.457***
		(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Respondent level	**Gender: Female**	–0.422 **	–0.329 *	–0.278 +	–0.287 +	–0.273+	–0.273 +	–0.273+	–0.271 +	–0.188	–0.182	–0.186	–0.171	–0.185
		(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.191 *	0.066	0.070	0.099	0.141	0.141	0.141	0.084	0.138	0.140	0.143	0.142	0.123
		(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.097)
	Age of respondent		–0.048 ***	–0.048 ***	–0.048***	–0.048***	–0.048 ***	–0.048***	–0.044 ***	–0.046***	–0.046***	–0.045 ***	–0.045***	–0.045***
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
	Own child in household			–0.105	–0.130	–0.133	–0.133	–0.133	–0.421	–0.363	–0.369	–0.382	–0.373	–0.434
				(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.264)	(0.266)	(0.265)	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.267)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)													
	Yes				–0.281	–0.239	–0.239	–0.239	–0.308	–0.371	–0.384	–0.352	–0.354	–0.278
					(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.257)	(0.260)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.262)	(0.264)
	Does not apply				–0.121	–0.108	–0.108	–0.108	–0.072	0.097	0.108	0.105	0.108	0.116
					(0.370)	(0.370)	(0.370)	(0.370)	(0.371)	(0.378)	(0.378)	(0.376)	(0.371)	(0.372)
	Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
	Employed – Part time (>20h)					–0.241	–0.241	–0.241	–0.247	–0.322	–0.331	–0.316	–0.317	–0.326
						(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.279)	(0.277)	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.276)
	Employed – Atypical					0.164	0.164	0.164	0.138	0.033	0.025	0.003	–0.007	–0.044
						(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.262)
	Self-employed					–0.177	–0.177	–0.177	–0.177	–0.020	–0.037	–0.016	–0.019	–0.071
						(0.348)	(0.348)	(0.348)	(0.352)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.378)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)					0.183	0.183	0.183	0.152	0.093	0.083	0.064	0.035	–0.008
						(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.250)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)
	Unemployed (>24 months)					0.222	0.222	0.222	0.187	0.095	0.082	0.076	0.039	–0.009
						(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.254)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.259)
	Inactive					0.525	0.525	0.525	0.520	0.320	0.295	0.271	0.242	0.195
						(0.547)	(0.547)	(0.547)	(0.559)	(0.565)	(0.567)	(0.561)	(0.562)	(0.553)

Table A-3: (Continued)

All respondents without partner	Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level													
Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)													
Rarely								0.143	0.191	0.190	0.194	0.204	0.173
								(0.340)	(0.333)	(0.333)	(0.335)	(0.336)	(0.338)
Sometimes								0.075	0.035	0.029	0.037	0.043	–0.007
								(0.329)	(0.327)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.330)	(0.330)
Often								–0.105	–0.118	–0.125	–0.150	–0.115	–0.128
								(0.394)	(0.384)	(0.383)	(0.386)	(0.387)	(0.384)
Very frequent								–0.277	0.053	0.053	0.068	0.095	0.156
								(0.620)	(0.669)	(0.668)	(0.668)	(0.662)	(0.652)
Single-person household								–0.333	–0.240	–0.250	–0.262	–0.233	–0.299
								(0.335)	(0.338)	(0.337)	(0.341)	(0.341)	(0.340)
Size of social network										–0.010	–0.008	–0.007	–0.006
										(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Attachment to the place of residence											–0.113 +	–0.109 +	–0.114 +
											(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Traditional family values (factor score)												0.171 *	0.146 +
												(0.081)	(0.083)
Regional level													
Community size (ref.: under 20,000)													
20,000–99,999													–0.136
													(0.251)
100,000+													0.220
													(0.223)
Eastern Germany													–0.236
													(0.181)
Unemployment rate (gender, occup. group, federal state)													0.013
													(0.012)
Intercept	4.496 ***	6.619 ***	6.611 ***	6.626 ***	6.445 ***	6.445 ***	6.445 ***	6.631 ***	6.079 ***	6.156 ***	6.597 ***	6.284 ***	6.449 ***
	(0.221)	(0.347)	(0.348)	(0.351)	(0.397)	(0.397)	(0.397)	(0.475)	(0.889)	(0.892)	(0.903)	(0.931)	(0.968)
Occupations	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050	6,050
Persons	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219
R^2 adjusted	0.162	0.181	0.181	0.181	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.183	0.209	0.209	0.210	0.212	0.214
BIC	31,513	31,379	31,387	31,400	31,439	31,439	31,439	31,473	31,756	31,762	31,761	31,757	31,772

Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

Table A-4: Willingness to relocate for a hypothetical job offer

	Job searchers without partner	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
		b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Respondent level	**Gender: Female**	−0.175 *	−0.146 *	−0.021	−0.023	−0.027	−0.027	−0.027	−0.024	−0.095	−0.098	−0.109	−0.114	−0.094
		(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.093)
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.006	−0.055	−0.022	−0.015	−0.054	−0.054	−0.054	0.059	0.080	0.086	0.070	0.073	0.063
		(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)
	Age of respondent		−0.015 ***	−0.015 ***	−0.015 ***	−0.014 ***	−0.014 ***	−0.014 ***	−0.017 ***	−0.015 ***	−0.015 ***	−0.014 ***	−0.014 ***	−0.013 ***
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	Own child in household			−0.286 **	−0.287 **	−0.280 **	−0.280 **	−0.280 **	0.011	0.009	0.022	−0.002	−0.008	−0.018
				(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.150)	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.149)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)													
	Yes				−0.069	−0.087	−0.087	−0.087	−0.024	−0.030	−0.034	0.054	0.059	0.066
					(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.143)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.140)
	Does not apply				0.027	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.008	0.026	0.030	0.044	0.040	0.030
					(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)
	Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
	Employed – Part time (>20h)					−0.377	−0.377	−0.377	−0.248	−0.188	−0.202	−0.265	−0.251	−0.249
						(0.342)	(0.342)	(0.342)	(0.344)	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.283)	(0.282)	(0.279)
	Employed – Atypical					−0.290	−0.290	−0.290	−0.202	−0.142	−0.150	−0.115	−0.097	−0.095
						(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.238)	(0.241)	(0.243)	(0.208)	(0.206)	(0.205)
	Self-employed					−0.493	−0.493	−0.493	−0.437	−0.520	−0.518	−0.733 +	−0.720 +	−0.703 +
						(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.473)	(0.472)	(0.459)	(0.460)	(0.384)	(0.377)	(0.392)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)					−0.441 *	−0.441 *	−0.441 *	−0.317	−0.270	−0.269	−0.201	−0.180	−0.173
						(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.196)	(0.194)	(0.194)
	Unemployed (>24 months)					−0.413 +	−0.413 +	−0.413 +	−0.285	−0.234	−0.239	−0.173	−0.148	−0.140
						(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.226)	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.198)
	Inactive					−0.297	−0.297	−0.297	−0.213	−0.059	−0.071	−0.039	−0.004	−0.008
						(0.423)	(0.423)	(0.423)	(0.424)	(0.431)	(0.430)	(0.335)	(0.328)	(0.332)

Table A-4: (Continued)

Job searchers without partner		Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level	Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)													
	Rarely								0.068	0.045	0.049	0.081	0.089	0.103
									(0.162)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
	Sometimes								–0.081	–0.096	–0.105	–0.061	–0.060	–0.046
									(0.142)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.141)
	Often								–0.106	–0.042	–0.038	–0.108	–0.108	–0.093
									(0.171)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.170)
	Very frequent								–0.717 ***	–0.538 **	–0.547 **	–0.487 *	–0.471 *	–0.455 *
									(0.179)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.213)	(0.216)	(0.219)
	Single-person household								0.336 +	0.346 +	0.355 +	0.300 +	0.297 +	0.291 +
									(0.179)	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.171)
	Size of social network										–0.005	–0.002	–0.002	–0.002
											(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
	Attachment to the place of residence											–0.254 ***	–0.254 ***	–0.254 ***
												(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
	Traditional family values (factor score)												–0.052	–0.053
													(0.039)	(0.040)
Regional level	Community size (ref.: under 20,000)													
	20,000–99,999													0.125
														(0.126)
	100,000+													0.067
														(0.102)
	Eastern Germany													–0.052
														(0.085)
	Unemployment rate (gender, occup. group, federal state)													–0.005
														(0.007)
Intercept		2.037 ***	2.713 ***	2.705 ***	2.695 ***	3.096 ***	3.096 ***	3.096 ***	2.721 ***	2.171 ***	2.187 ***	3.117 ***	3.180 ***	3.190 ***
		(0.076)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.351)	(0.502)	(0.503)	(0.498)	(0.507)	(0.498)
Occupations		No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		853	853	853	853	853	853	853	853	853	853	853	853	853
Persons														
R^2 adjusted		0.005	0.024	0.034	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.042	0.067	0.068	0.168	0.169	0.168
BIC		2,464	2,454	2,451	2,464	2,498	2,498	2,498	2,518	2,810	2,815	2,723	2,728	2,752

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

Table A-5: Number of applications to interregional vacancies

	Job searchers without partner	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
		b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Respondent level	**Gender: Female**	−0.224 +	−0.201	−0.070	−0.058	−0.040	−0.040	−0.040	−0.045	0.010	0.010	0.004	−0.009	−0.038
		(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.218)
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.074	0.031	0.067	0.036	0.073	0.073	0.073	0.150	0.058	0.061	0.060	0.065	0.061
		(0.223)	(0.210)	(0.230)	(0.238)	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.288)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.241)
	Age of respondent	−0.011 +	−0.011 +	−0.011 +	−0.013 *	−0.013 +	−0.013 +	−0.013 +	−0.015 *	−0.015 +	−0.015 +	−0.014 +	−0.014 +	−0.015 +
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	Own child in household		−0.299	−0.302	−0.302	−0.292	−0.292	−0.292	−0.085	−0.142	−0.138	−0.146	−0.151	−0.159
			(0.220)	(0.226)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.237)	(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.283)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)													
	Yes				0.332	0.322	0.322	0.322	0.373	0.092	0.090	0.122	0.144	0.157
					(0.285)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.274)	(0.347)	(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.344)	(0.344)
	Does not apply				−0.264 +	−0.251 +	−0.251 +	−0.251 +	−0.269 +	−0.499 +	−0.499 +	−0.499 +	−0.510 +	−0.488 +
					(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.268)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.270)	(0.262)
	Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)													
	Employed – Part time (>20h)					−0.384	−0.384	−0.384	−0.332	−0.314	−0.318	−0.322	−0.303	−0.361
						(0.334)	(0.334)	(0.334)	(0.351)	(0.374)	(0.373)	(0.366)	(0.363)	(0.363)
	Employed – Atypical					−0.346	−0.346	−0.346	−0.274	−0.313	−0.316	−0.296	−0.243	−0.302
						(0.342)	(0.342)	(0.342)	(0.354)	(0.378)	(0.377)	(0.367)	(0.356)	(0.368)
	Self-employed					−0.293	−0.293	−0.293	−0.240	−0.652	−0.655	−0.633	−0.606	−0.669
						(0.362)	(0.362)	(0.362)	(0.373)	(0.475)	(0.476)	(0.469)	(0.463)	(0.487)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)					0.061	0.061	0.061	0.160	0.004	0.004	0.034	0.087	0.019
						(0.435)	(0.435)	(0.435)	(0.456)	(0.409)	(0.409)	(0.402)	(0.395)	(0.393)
	Unemployed (>24 months)					−0.132	−0.132	−0.132	−0.030	−0.224	−0.226	−0.197	−0.136	−0.210
						(0.399)	(0.399)	(0.399)	(0.422)	(0.394)	(0.394)	(0.383)	(0.374)	(0.382)
	Inactive					−0.258	−0.258	−0.258	−0.272	−0.256	−0.261	−0.259	−0.153	−0.233
						(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.446)	(0.501)	(0.500)	(0.489)	(0.474)	(0.505)

Table A-5: (Continued)

Job searchers without partner		Model 0 b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se	Model 9 b/se	Model 10 b/se	Model 11 b/se	Model 12 b/se
Respondent level	Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)													
	Rarely								0.242	0.040	0.041	0.039	0.059	0.048
									(0.242)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.272)	(0.268)
	Sometimes								0.232	0.035	0.032	0.049	0.046	0.030
									(0.257)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.235)
	Often								–0.231	–0.283	–0.280	–0.309	–0.319	–0.324
									(0.174)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.224)
	Very frequent								–0.354 +	–0.188	–0.191	–0.171	–0.139	–0.165
									(0.190)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.226)	(0.242)	(0.237)
	Single-person household								0.356 +	0.178	0.181	0.161	0.153	0.140
									(0.205)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.214)
	Size of social network										–0.002	–0.001	–0.001	–0.001
											(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	Attachment to the place of residence											–0.101	–0.103 +	–0.101
												(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)
	Traditional family values (factor score)												–0.119	–0.112
													(0.073)	(0.073)
Regional level	Community size (ref.: under 20,000)													
	20,000–99,999													0.082
														(0.214)
	100,000+													0.144
														(0.191)
	Eastern Germany													–0.015
														(0.185)
	Unemployment rate (gender, occup. group, federal state)													0.016
														(0.014)
Intercept		0.486 +	0.997 ***	0.993 ***	1.069 ***	1.122 *	1.122 *	1.122 *	0.742	1.150	1.157	1.526 *	1.673 *	1.598 *
		(0.255)	(0.280)	(0.280)	(0.293)	(0.511)	(0.511)	(0.511)	(0.581)	(0.714)	(0.711)	(0.705)	(0.727)	(0.762)
Occupations		No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		942	942	942	942	942	942	942	942	942	942	942	942	942
Persons														
R^2 adjusted		0.001	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.027	0.026	0.028	0.029	0.027
BIC		4,178	4,182	4,186	4,198	4,235	4,235	4,235	4,265	4,575	4,581	4,585	4,590	4,615

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

Table A-6: Acceptance of vignette job offer without implausible vignettes

All respondents with partner in household		No temporary offers to employees with a permanent contract	No part-time offers to full-time employees	both
		b/se	b/se	b/se
Vignette level	Percentage increase in household income	0.028 ***	0.026 ***	0.028 ***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
	Weekly working hours (ref.: 20 hours)			
	30 hours	–0.371 *	–0.264 *	–0.279
		(0.149)	(0.115)	(0.190)
	40 hours	–0.770 ***	–0.532 ***	–0.605 ***
		(0.133)	(0.102)	(0.170)
	Level of over-qualification (ref.: None)			
	Slight	–0.041	–0.085	–0.097
		(0.120)	(0.077)	(0.133)
	Considerable	–0.249 *	–0.181 *	–0.328 *
		(0.120)	(0.080)	(0.138)
	Prospects of promotion (ref.: None)			
	Few	0.121	0.077	0.079
		(0.120)	(0.079)	(0.135)
	Many	0.564 ***	0.458 ***	0.606 ***
		(0.125)	(0.080)	(0.141)
	Duration of employment (ref.: Permanent employment)			
	Temporary, 1-year contract	–0.947 ***	–0.882 ***	–0.950 ***
		(0.245)	(0.086)	(0.269)
	Temporary, 3-year contract	–0.130	–0.473 ***	–0.196
		(0.257)	(0.083)	(0.274)
	Commuting distance (ref.: 1 hour (1-way))			
	4 hours	–2.517 ***	–2.285 ***	–2.479 ***
		(0.131)	(0.094)	(0.144)
	6 hours	–2.895 ***	–2.548 ***	–2.832 ***
		(0.134)	(0.097)	(0.147)
	Local employment opportunities (ref.: Worse than place of residence)			
	Similar	0.346 **	0.342 ***	0.349 **
		(0.120)	(0.081)	(0.135)
	Better	0.412 ***	0.353 ***	0.456 ***
		(0.116)	(0.080)	(0.132)
	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation (ref.: Very easy)			
	With some effort	–0.271 *	–0.210 **	–0.293 *
		(0.118)	(0.079)	(0.134)
	With considerable effort	–0.663 ***	–0.332 ***	–0.646 ***
		(0.123)	(0.082)	(0.139)
Respondent level	**Gender: Female**	–0.396 *	–0.310 +	–0.405 +
		(0.186)	(0.160)	(0.207)
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.033	0.005	0.040
		(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.024)
	Age of respondent	–0.025 **	–0.021 **	–0.021 *
		(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)

Table A-6: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household		No temporary offers to employees with a permanent contract	No part-time offers to full-time employees	both
		b/se	b/se	b/se
Respondent level	Relative education in years (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)			
	Resp. equal to partner	0.003	–0.057	–0.129
		(0.186)	(0.146)	(0.198)
	Resp. higher than partner	0.318 +	0.179	0.254
		(0.193)	(0.149)	(0.205)
	Missing information (from partner)	0.795	1.601	0.025
		(0.988)	(1.162)	(0.894)
	No partner interview	0.054	0.007	–0.023
		(0.255)	(0.206)	(0.271)
	Relative net income (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)			
	Resp. equal to partner	0.071	–0.230	–0.321
		(0.280)	(0.214)	(0.288)
	Resp. higher than partner	0.083	–0.240	–0.154
		(0.230)	(0.188)	(0.247)
	Missing information (from partner)	–0.323	–0.555	–0.770 +
		(0.428)	(0.348)	(0.403)
	Own child in household	0.226	0.249 *	0.343 *
		(0.155)	(0.123)	(0.169)
	Property ownership ref.: No			
	Yes	–0.737 ***	–0.713 ***	–0.747 ***
		(0.171)	(0.128)	(0.182)
	Does not apply	–0.268	–0.203	–0.208
		(0.382)	(0.328)	(0.400)
	Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)			
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	–0.298	–0.087	–0.274
		(0.228)	(0.173)	(0.257)
	Employed – Atypical	–0.199	–0.148	–0.352
		(0.238)	(0.175)	(0.267)
	Self-employed	–0.229	0.305	–0.176
		(0.350)	(0.256)	(0.364)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	0.088	0.341	0.138
		(0.271)	(0.215)	(0.294)
	Unemployed (>24 months)	–0.478	–0.124	–0.462
		(0.371)	(0.272)	(0.391)
	Inactive	–0.798 **	–0.383 +	–0.787 *
		(0.285)	(0.223)	(0.316)
	Relative work experience (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)			
	Resp. equal to partner	–0.142	–0.158	–0.367
		(0.257)	(0.206)	(0.277)
	Resp. higher than partner	–0.092	0.023	–0.019
		(0.192)	(0.154)	(0.207)
	Missing information (from partner)	0.506	0.205	0.528
		(0.339)	(0.269)	(0.364)

Table A-6: (Continued)

	All respondents with partner in household	No temporary offers to employees with a permanent contract	No part-time offers to full-time employees	both
		b/se	b/se	b/se
Respondent level	Relative ISEI (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)			
	Resp. equal to partner	0.172	0.344 +	0.216
		(0.244)	(0.198)	(0.255)
	Resp. higher than partner	–0.138	0.007	–0.101
		(0.185)	(0.140)	(0.196)
	Missing information (from partner)	–0.190	0.363	–0.067
		(0.302)	(0.242)	(0.325)
	Married and living together	–0.001	–0.170	–0.137
		(0.168)	(0.139)	(0.181)
	Employment status of partner (ref.: Employed – Full time)			
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	–0.020	0.015	–0.100
		(0.271)	(0.198)	(0.276)
	Employed – Atypical	–0.006	0.013	–0.030
		(0.271)	(0.212)	(0.290)
	Self-employed	–0.028	0.093	0.062
		(0.352)	(0.285)	(0.377)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	0.115	0.485 +	0.397
		(0.324)	(0.257)	(0.343)
	Unemployed (>24 months)	0.585	0.573 +	0.783 *
		(0.377)	(0.300)	(0.390)
	Inactive	0.346	0.260	0.631 *
		(0.274)	(0.220)	(0.301)
	Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)			
	Rarely	–0.033	0.057	–0.052
		(0.218)	(0.167)	(0.227)
	Sometimes	0.100	0.013	0.098
		(0.217)	(0.166)	(0.229)
	Often	0.011	–0.103	–0.118
		(0.300)	(0.224)	(0.303)
	Very frequent	0.500	0.792 +	0.590
		(0.678)	(0.471)	(0.683)
	Size of social network	–0.014	–0.007	–0.014
		(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)
	Attachment to the place of residence	–0.264 ***	–0.233 ***	–0.294 ***
		(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.069)
	Traditional family values (factor score)	0.176 *	0.203 **	0.135
		(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.090)
Regional level	Community size (ref.: under 20,000)			
	20,000–99,999	0.058	0.223	0.162
		(0.229)	(0.179)	(0.248)
	100,000+	0.144	0.278 +	0.306
		(0.214)	(0.159)	(0.230)
	Eastern Germany	–0.238	0.016	–0.119
		(0.180)	(0.143)	(0.197)
	Unemployment rate (County level)	0.020	–0.002	0.006
		(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)

Table A-6: (Continued)

All respondents with partner in household	No temporary offers to employees with a permanent contract	No part-time offers to full-time employees	both
	b/se	b/se	b/se
Intercept	6.011 ***	5.450 ***	5.962 ***
	(1.014)	(0.796)	(1.067)
Occupations	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,340	8,868	3,391
Persons	1,962	2,206	1,725
R^2 adjusted	0.224	0.225	0.230
BIC	23,402	46,059	18,357

All respondents without partner		No temporary offers to employees with a permanent contract	No part–time offers to full–time employees	both
		b/se	b/se	b/se
Vignette level	Percentage increase in household–income	0.030 ***	0.027 ***	0.029 ***
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
	Weekly working hours (ref.: 20 hours)			
	30 hours	–0.444 *	–0.217	–0.481 *
		(0.197)	(0.136)	(0.232)
	40 hours	–0.685 ***	–0.517 ***	–0.574 **
		(0.184)	(0.127)	(0.218)
	Level of over-qualification (ref.: None)			
	Slight	–0.196	–0.173 +	–0.251
		(0.155)	(0.102)	(0.167)
	Considerable	–0.305 +	–0.360 ***	–0.350 *
		(0.158)	(0.103)	(0.168)
	Prospects of promotion (ref.: None)			
	Few	–0.082	–0.162	–0.152
		(0.159)	(0.101)	(0.170)
	Many	0.398 *	0.327 **	0.214
		(0.169)	(0.107)	(0.184)
	Duration of employment (ref.: Permanent employment)			
	Temporary, 1-year contract	–0.743 **	–0.833 ***	–0.744 *
		(0.283)	(0.109)	(0.307)
	Temporary, 3-year contract	–0.286	–0.472 ***	–0.120
		(0.313)	(0.108)	(0.334)
	Commuting distance (ref.: 1 hour (1-way))			
	4 hours	–2.597 ***	–2.368 ***	–2.716 ***
		(0.175)	(0.128)	(0.186)
	6 hours	–2.772 ***	–2.614 ***	–2.775 ***
		(0.169)	(0.124)	(0.183)
	Local employment opportunities (ref.: Worse than place of residence)			
	Similar	0.490 **	0.570 ***	0.482 **
		(0.169)	(0.105)	(0.181)
	Better	0.442 **	0.240 *	0.317 +
		(0.160)	(0.103)	(0.173)
	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation (ref.: Very easy)			
	With some effort	–0.382 *	–0.250 *	–0.500 **
		(0.161)	(0.111)	(0.177)
	With considerable effort	–0.562 ***	–0.460 ***	–0.628 ***
		(0.162)	(0.104)	(0.177)

Table A-6: (Continued)

All respondents without partner		No temporary offers to employees with a permanent contract b/se	No part-time offers to full-time employees b/se	both
Respondent level	Gender: Female	0.102	–0.228	0.012
		(0.229)	(0.192)	(0.242)
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.129	0.064	0.040
		(0.124)	(0.100)	(0.123)
	Age of respondent	–0.036 ***	–0.048 ***	–0.042 ***
		(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
	Own child in household	–0.590 +	–0.307	–0.473
		(0.356)	(0.272)	(0.369)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)			
	Yes	–0.439	–0.145	–0.350
		(0.330)	(0.277)	(0.354)
	Does not apply	–0.149	0.257	–0.052
		(0.496)	(0.386)	(0.523)
	Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)			
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	–0.355	–0.451	–0.392
		(0.387)	(0.302)	(0.438)
	Employed – Atypical	–0.072	–0.243	–0.286
		(0.338)	(0.289)	(0.400)
	Self-employed	0.338	–0.167	0.456
		(0.495)	(0.398)	(0.539)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	–0.022	–0.100	–0.019
		(0.334)	(0.287)	(0.400)
	Unemployed (>24 months)	0.063	–0.079	0.105
		(0.339)	(0.287)	(0.401)
	Inactive	0.752	0.081	0.713
		(0.765)	(0.562)	(0.794)
	Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)			
	Rarely	0.670	0.304	0.767 +
		(0.434)	(0.346)	(0.456)
	Sometimes	0.274	0.087	0.442
		(0.436)	(0.340)	(0.466)
	Often	–0.073	–0.170	–0.087
		(0.484)	(0.394)	(0.509)
	Very frequent	0.465	0.132	0.486
		(0.872)	(0.653)	(0.851)
	Single–person household	0.010	–0.215	0.051
		(0.453)	(0.352)	(0.487)
	Size of social network	–0.010	–0.01	–0.015
		(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.017)
	Attachment to the place of residence	–0.121	–0.09	–0.071
		(0.080)	(0.061)	(0.080)
	Traditional family values (factor score)	0.047	0.136	0.041
		(0.109)	(0.086)	(0.115)

Table A-6: (Continued)

All respondents without partner		No temporary offers to employees with a permanent contract b/se	No part-time offers to full-time employees b/se	both
Regional level	Community size (ref.: under 20,000)			
	20,000–99,999	–0.310	–0.110	–0.308
		(0.338)	(0.255)	(0.344)
	100,000+	0.081	0.218	0.080
		(0.289)	(0.226)	(0.294)
	Eastern Germany	–0.193	–0.188	–0.144
		(0.242)	(0.185)	(0.249)
	Unemployment rate (County level)	0.013	0.005	0.002
		(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.018)
Intercept		6.135 ***	6.438 ***	6.015 ***
		(1.455)	(0.958)	(1.406)
Occupations		Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		2,553	5,360	2,205
Persons		1,083	1,209	1,033
R^2 adjusted		0.210	0.218	0.217
BIC		13,960	28,151	12,094

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).

Table A-7: Acceptance of vignette job offer for only job searchers

Job searchers with partner in household		Acceptance of vignette job offer b/se
Vignette level	Percentage increase in household income	0.028 ***
		(0.003)
	Weekly working hours (ref.: 20 hours)	
	30 hours	–0.133
		(0.214)
	40 hours	–0.416 *
		(0.182)
	Level of over-qualification (ref.: None)	
	Slight	–0.003
		(0.161)
	Considerable	–0.046
		(0.158)
	Prospects of promotion (ref.: None)	
	Few	0.095
		(0.156)
	Many	0.358 *
		(0.162)
	Duration of employment (ref.: Permanent employment)	
	Temporary, 1-year contract	–0.736 ***
		(0.169)
	Temporary, 3-year contract	–0.399 *
		(0.167)

Table A-7: (Continued)

Job searchers with partner in household		Acceptance of vignette job offer b/se
Vignette level	Commuting distance (ref.: 1 hour (1–way))	
	4 hours	–2.880 ***
		(0.190)
	6 hours	–3.244 ***
		(0.202)
	Local employment opportunities (ref.: Worse than place of residence)	
	Similar	0.062
		(0.165)
	Better	0.126
		(0.162)
	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation (ref.: Very easy)	
	With some effort	–0.228
		(0.155)
	With considerable effort	–0.313 +
		(0.161)
Respondent level	Gender: Female	–0.541
		(0.340)
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.186
		(0.129)
	Age of respondent	–0.013
		(0.015)
	Relative education in years (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)	
	Resp. equal to partner	–0.532
		(0.349)
	Resp. higher than partner	–0.110
		(0.326)
	Missing information (from partner)	–1.096
		(0.668)
	No partner interview	0.579
		(0.543)
	Relative net income (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)	
	Resp. equal to partner	0.018
		(0.469)
	Resp. higher than partner	–0.714
		(0.437)
	Missing information (from partner)	0.414
		(1.305)
	Own child in household	0.346
		(0.276)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)	
	Yes	–0.991 **
		(0.336)
	Does not apply	–0.786
		(0.598)

Table A-7: (Continued)

Job searchers with partner in household		Acceptance of vignette job offer b/se
Respondent level	Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)	
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	–0.629
		(0.529)
	Employed – Atypical	–0.168
		(0.539)
	Self-employed	–0.703
		(0.985)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	–0.217
		(0.494)
	Unemployed (>24 months)	–0.957
		(0.594)
	Inactive	–1.043 +
		(0.616)
	Relative work experience (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)	
	Resp. equal to partner	–0.224
		(0.593)
	Resp. higher than partner	–0.169
		(0.319)
	Missing information (from partner)	1.158 *
		(0.523)
	Relative ISEI (ref.: Resp. lower than partner)	
	Resp. equal to partner	0.517
		(0.446)
	Resp. higher than partner	–0.086
		(0.325)
	Missing information (from partner)	0.199
		(0.475)
	Married and living together	–0.321
		(0.293)
	Employment status of partner (ref.: Employed – Full time)	
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	–0.195
		(0.562)
	Employed – Atypical	0.724
		(0.565)
	Self-employed	–0.672
		(0.616)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	1.057 +
		(0.564)
	Unemployed (>24 months)	1.223 +
		(0.638)
	Inactive	1.167 *
		(0.577)

Table A-7: (Continued)

Job searchers with partner in household		Acceptance of vignette job offer b/se
Respondent level	Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)	
	Rarely	–0.334
		(0.343)
	Sometimes	–0.627 +
		(0.336)
	Often	–0.662
		(0.412)
	Very frequent	1.465
		(0.897)
	Size of social network	–0.002
		(0.017)
	Attachment to the place of residence	–0.231 *
		(0.115)
	Traditional family values (factor score)	0.111
		(0.137)
Regional level	Community size (ref.: under 20,000)	
	20,000–99,999	–0.124
		(0.444)
	100,000+	0.204
		(0.407)
	Eastern Germany	–0.106
		(0.331)
	Unemployment rate (County level)	0.012
		(0.026)
Intercept		8.569 ***
		(1.659)
Occupations		Yes
Observations		2,231
Persons		449
R^2 adjusted		0.296
BIC		12,075
Job searchers without partner		**Acceptance of vignette job offer b/se**
Vignette level	Percentage increase in household–income	0.026 ***
		(0.003)
	Weekly working hours (ref.: 20 hours)	
	30 hours	–0.120
		(0.203)
	40 hours	–0.357 +
		(0.191)
	Level of over–qualification (ref.: None)	
	Slight	–0.180
		(0.154)
	Considerable	–0.342 *
		(0.158)

Table A-7: (Continued)

	Job searchers without partner	Acceptance of vignette job offer b/se
Vignette level	Prospects of promotion (ref.: None)	
	Few	–0.187
		(0.161)
	Many	0.238
		(0.160)
	Duration of employment (ref.: Permanent employment)	
	Temporary, 1-year contract	–0.474 **
		(0.160)
	Temporary, 3-year contract	–0.422 *
		(0.166)
	Commuting distance (ref.: 1 hour (one-way))	
	4 hours	–2.814 ***
		(0.197)
	6 hours	–2.985 ***
		(0.192)
	Local employment opportunities (ref.: Worse than place of residence)	
	Similar	0.581 **
		(0.177)
	Better	0.384 *
		(0.164)
	Difficulty of finding adequate accommodation (ref.: Very easy)	
	With some effort	–0.279 +
		(0.166)
	With considerable effort	–0.414 *
		(0.161)
Respondent level	Gender: Female	–0.118
		(0.302)
	Household income in 1,000 euros	0.664 **
		(0.241)
	Age of respondent	–0.012
		(0.013)
	Own child in household	–0.644
		(0.467)
	Property ownership (ref.: No)	
	Yes	0.167
		(0.545)
	Does not apply	0.235
		(0.552)
	Employment status (ref.: Employed – Full time)	
	Employed – Part time (>20h)	–2.306 **
		(0.844)
	Employed – Atypical	–0.323
		(0.742)
	Self-employed	–1.102
		(0.893)
	Unemployed (≤24 months)	–0.402
		(0.734)
	Unemployed (>24 months)	–0.719
		(0.719)
	Inactive	–0.096
		(1.132)

Table A-7: (Continued)

	Job searchers without partner	Acceptance of vignette job offer b/se
Respondent level	Conflict with household (ref.: Very rare or never)	
	Rarely	–0.786
		(0.573)
	Sometimes	–0.36
		(0.535)
	Often	–1.28 *
		(0.639)
	Very frequent	–0.386
		(0.960)
	Single–person household	–0.815
		(0.574)
	Size of social network	0.013
		(0.018)
	Attachment to the place of residence	–0.236 *
		(0.093)
	Traditional family values (factor score)	0.125
		(0.145)
Regional level	Community size ref.: under 20,000	
	20,000–99,999	0.032
		(0.398)
	100,000+	0.454
		(0.356)
	Eastern Germany	–0.148
		(0.301)
	Unemployment rate (County level)	–0.002
		(0.021)
Intercept		6.532 ***
		(1.243)
Occupations		Yes
Observations		2,292
Persons		462
R^2 adjusted		0.256
BIC		12,263

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).